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Articles
HAPPINESS SURVEYS AND PUBLIC POLICY:
WHAT’S THE USE?
MATTHEW D. ADLER†
ABSTRACT
Subjective well-being (SWB) surveys ask respondents to quantify
their overall or momentary happiness or life-satisfaction, or pose
similar questions about other aspects of respondents’ mental states. A
large empirical literature in economics and psychology has grown up
around such surveys. Increasingly, too, scholars have advanced the
normative proposal that SWB surveys be used for policymaking—for
example, by using survey results to calculate monetary equivalents for
nonmarket goods (to be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis), or to
calculate “gross national happiness.”
This Article skeptically evaluates the policy role of SWB data. It is
critical to distinguish between (1) using SWB surveys as evidence of
preference utility versus (2) using them as evidence of experience
utility. Preference utility is a measure of the extent to which someone
has realized her preferences; experience utility, a measure of the
quality of someone’s mental states. The two are quite different
because individuals can have preferences regarding non-mental
occurrences.
Having drawn this distinction, the Article then argues, first, that
SWB surveys are poor evidence of preference utility—given problems

Copyright © 2013 Matthew D. Adler.
† Richard A. Horvitz Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, Philosophy and
Public Policy, Duke University. Many thanks for helpful comments to faculty workshop
participants at the law schools of Duke University, Loyola University Chicago, the University of
California, Berkeley, the University of Illinois, and the University of Pennsylvania; to faculty
workshop participants at Duke’s Sanford School of Public Policy; to participants in the Duke
Law Journal’s 43rd Annual Administrative Law Symposium: “A Happiness Approach to CostBenefit Analysis”; and to Dan Benjamin, John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, Maureen
Cropper, David DePianto, Ed Diener, Paul Dolan, Marc Fleurbaey, Stephen Galoob, Carol
Graham, Jennifer Hawkins, Ori Heffetz, Rob Kar, Jon Masur, Michael Moore, Doug Noonan,
Galen Panger, Eric Posner, Arden Rowell, Rick Swedloff, Peter Ubel, and Jonathan Wiener.
The usual disclaimer applies. Thanks to David Merritt and Melinda Patterson for excellent
research assistance and to Bill Draper and Kelley Leong for amazing library support.

ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1510

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/15/2013 2:56 PM

[Vol. 62:1509

of preference and scale heterogeneity, as well as other difficulties.
Stated-preference surveys are a much better survey format for eliciting
preference utility. Second, in considering SWB surveys as an
experience-utility
measure,
we
should
recognize
that
“experientialism” about well-being—the view that well-being is simply
a matter of good experiences—is highly controversial. More plausibly,
an experience-utility measure might be seen as an indicator of one
aspect of well-being. However, even constructing this “weak”
experience-utility measure is not straightforward—as the Article
demonstrates by discussing Daniel Kahneman’s detailed proposal for
such a metric.
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INTRODUCTION
“Happiness” is all the rage. A fast-growing literature in
economics, growing out of work by research psychologists concerning
positive psychological states, examines the determinants of
1
individuals’ happiness or feelings of satisfaction with their lives.
Much work in this literature, often referred to as the literature on
subjective well-being (SWB), is based upon large-scale surveys,
posing questions such as, “Taken all together, would you say that you
are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” Or, “All things
considered, how satisfied would you say you are with your life these
days? Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means very
dissatisfied and 10 means very satisfied.” A respondent’s answer to
such a question can then be correlated with information about other
attributes, ascertained by additional questions—for example, her
income, relative income, employment status, whether she is married
or has children, her health condition, and so forth.

1. For overviews, see generally LUIGINO BRUNI & PIER LUIGI PORTA, ECONOMICS AND
HAPPINESS: FRAMING THE ANALYSIS (2005); BRUNO S. FREY, HAPPINESS: A REVOLUTION IN
ECONOMICS (2008); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW
THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING (2002); HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF HAPPINESS (Luigino Bruni & Pier Luigi Porta eds., 2007); THE SCIENCE OF
WELL-BEING (Felicia A. Huppert, Nick Baylis & Barry Keverne eds., 2005); WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz
eds., 1999); Ed Diener, Eunkook M. Suh, Richard E. Lucas & Heidi L. Smith, Subjective WellBeing: Three Decades of Progress, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 276 (1999); Paul Dolan, Tessa Peasgood
& Mathew White, Do We Really Know What Makes Us Happy? A Review of the Economic
Literature on the Factors Associated with Subjective Well-Being, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 94
(2008).
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Table 1 excerpts the questions about happiness or life
satisfaction that are posed by the surveys most widely used by SWB
2
researchers.
Table 1. Widely Used SWB Questions
Survey
General Social
Survey

Variable

Question
Taken all together, how would you say things are these

Happiness

days? Would you say that you are very happy, pretty
happy, or not too happy?
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your

World Values
Survey

Life sat.

life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help
with your answer. [range of 1-10 with 1 labelled “Very
Dissatisfied” and 10 labelled “Very Satisfied”]
Taking all things together, how happy would you say

European Social
Survey

Happiness

you are? Please use this card [range of 0-10 with 0
labelled

“Extremely

unhappy”

and

10

labelled

“Extremely happy”]
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your
life as a whole nowadays? Please answer using this
European Social
Survey

Life sat.

card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10
means extremely satisfied. [range of 0-10 with 0
labelled “Extremely dissatisfied” and 10 labelled
“Extremely satisfied”]

European
Quality of Life

Taking all things together on a scale of 1 of 10, how
Happiness

Survey

very unhappy and 10 means you are very happy.
All things considered, how satisfied would you say you

European
Quality of Life

happy would you say you are? Here 1 means you are

Life sat.

Survey

are with your life these days? Please tell me on a scale
of 1 to 10, where 1 means very dissatisfied and 10
means very satisfied.
In conclusion, we would like to ask you about your

German SocioEconomic Panel

satisfaction with your life in general. Please answer
Life sat.

according to the following scale: 0 means ‘completely
dissatisfied’, 10 means ‘completely satisfied’. How
satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?

British
Household
Panel Survey

How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life
Life sat.

overall? [range of 1-7 with 1 labelled “Not satisfied at
all” and 7 labelled “Completely satisfied”.]

2. The table is taken from Richard R. Layard, G. Mayraz & S. Nickell, The Marginal
Utility of Income, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1846, 1848 tbl.1 (2008). Many thanks to Marc Fleurbaey for
the reference.
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Some SWB researchers have objected to these standard
questions, which invite respondents to express their overall happiness
or life satisfaction, that is, to reflect on all the circumstances of their
lives, and then to quantify their happiness or life satisfaction with
these total circumstances in view. Daniel Kahneman, most
prominently, has argued that SWB surveys should focus instead on
3
moment-to-moment happiness. The trajectory of an individual’s
momentary happiness over a given time period can be estimated via
4
“experience sampling” : she will be given a small electronic device
which will periodically beep, prompting her to quantify her happiness
at that moment. Alternatively, and somewhat less intrusively, a
5
survey might employ the so-called “day reconstruction method.” At
the end of each day during the survey period, respondents will be
asked to recollect the episodes of the day and to rate the affective
6
quality of each episode.
Kahneman and collaborators used the day-reconstruction
7
method in a study of working women in Texas. Respondents were
asked to assign each episode a number from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very
much) on various scales—for example, how “happy” she felt during
the episode, how “warm/friendly,” how “frustrated/annoyed,” or how
8
“depressed/blue.” A measure of the respondent’s “positive affect”
during the episode was calculated by averaging how she rated the
episode on three of the scales (happy, warm/friendly, enjoyment), and
her “negative affect” during the episode was similarly calculated by
averaging her ratings on six other scales (frustrated/annoyed,
depressed/blue, hassled/pushed around, angry/hostile, worried/
anxious, criticized/put down).
The questions posed by Kahneman and collaborators in the
Texas study are certainly different, in some respects, from the
questions summarized in Table 1. For that matter, “How happy are

3. See infra note 176; see also infra Part III.B.
4. Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A.
Stone, National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life, in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE
WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF TIME USE AND WELL-BEING 9, 30–31
(Alan B. Krueger ed., 2009).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David A. Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A.
Stone, A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction
Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776, 1776–77 (2004).
8. Id. at 1777 tbl.1.
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you?” is not semantically equivalent to “How satisfied are you with
your life?” We might expect to see (and indeed do see) a somewhat
different pattern of responses to happiness versus life-satisfaction
9
questions. Still, questions regarding momentary happiness,
momentary affects, overall happiness, or overall life satisfaction share
a crucial similarity: all ask the respondent to consider some aspect of
her mental life and to rate that aspect on a numerical scale or, nearly
equivalently, to assign that aspect to one of a series of ordered
categories. For short, I will call any such survey a “SWB” survey and
data or research grounded on such surveys “SWB” data or research.
Note that my definition includes the surveys understood by
researchers as paradigmatic SWB surveys, namely the surveys in
Table 1, as well as questions such as, “How angry are you right
now?,” “How painful is this?,” or “How happy did you feel when you
were doing that?”
Scholars working in the SWB literature tend to be empiricists—
psychologists or empirical economists who use sophisticated
econometric techniques to tease out the causal connections that SWB
data might illuminate. However, by no means has the literature been
wholly empirical and non-normative. Strikingly, many of the leading
researchers have also advanced normative recommendations
10
regarding government policy. They have drawn upon SWB research
9. See Ed Diener, Weiting Ng, James Harter & Raksha Arora, Wealth and Happiness
Across the World: Material Prosperity Predicts Life Evaluation, Whereas Psychosocial Prosperity
Predicts Positive Feeling, 99 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 52, 58–60 (2010); Daniel
Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but Not Emotional
Well-Being, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,489, 16,489 (2010).
10. Scholarship endorsing the use of SWB surveys for law or policy purposes includes
DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN FROM THE NEW
RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING (2010); ED DIENER, RICHARD E. LUCAS, ULRICH SCHIMMACK &
JOHN F. HELLIWELL, WELL-BEING FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2009); FREY, supra note 1; FREY &
STUTZER, supra note 1; CAROL GRAHAM, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AN ECONOMY OF
WELL-BEING (2011); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (rev. &
updated ed. 2011); MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, supra note 4;
Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan
S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583 (2010) [hereinafter Bronsteen, Buccafusco
and Masur, Welfare as Happiness]; John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S.
Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013) [hereinafter
Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Well-Being Analysis]; Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman,
Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1 (2004); Ed
Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National Index, 55
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 34 (2000); Paul Dolan & Mathew P. White, How Can Measures of
Subjective Well-Being Be Used To Inform Public Policy?, 2 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 71 (2007);
Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 405
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either to advocate particular policy measures or to argue for new
kinds of policy-evaluation tools.
Two such tools have received sustained scholarly attention. The
first is the use of SWB data to determine monetary equivalents for
nonmarket goods, with these equivalents then incorporated in cost11
benefit analysis. Imagine that regression techniques are used to
estimate an equation from survey data, whereby an individual’s life
satisfaction measured on a numerical scale is the dependent variable
and various independent variables are given, including both an
individual’s income and her level of some nonmarket good. The
coefficient on income is cy, meaning that an increase in income by $1
is estimated to produce cy units of increase in life satisfaction, whereas
the coefficient on the nonmarket good is cG, meaning that an increase
of 1 unit in an individual’s level of the good is estimated to produce cG
units of increase in life satisfaction. The monetary equivalent for 1
12
unit of the good is thus cG/cy dollars.

(2010); and Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur
Stone, Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 429
(2004). For further such scholarship, see infra notes 11, 13.
11. For overviews of this approach, see DANIEL FUJIWARA & ROSS CAMPBELL, DEP’T
FOR WORK & PENSIONS (UK), VALUATION TECHNIQUES FOR SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: STATED PREFERENCE, REVEALED PREFERENCE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
APPROACHES (2011); Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, A Simple Statistical Method for
Measuring How Life Events Affect Happiness, 31 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1139 (2002); Bruno S.
Frey, Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer, The Life Satisfaction Approach to Environmental
Valuation, 2 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 139 (2010); Heinz Welsch & Jan Kühling, Using
Happiness Data for Environmental Valuation: Issues and Applications, 23 J. ECON. SURVS. 385
(2009); and Paul Dolan, Daniel Fujiwara & Robert Metcalfe, A Step Towards Valuing Utility the
Marginal and Cardinal Way (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 1062, 2011).
Recent examples include Christopher L. Ambrey & Christopher M. Fleming, Valuing Scenic
Amenity Using Life Satisfaction Data, 72 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 106 (2011); Arik Levinson,
Valuing Public Goods Using Happiness Data: The Case of Air Quality, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 869
(2012); Tobias Menz & Heinz Welsch, Life-Cycle and Cohort Effects in the Valuation of Air
Quality: Evidence from Subjective Well-Being Data, 88 LAND ECON. 300 (2012); and Nattavudh
Powdthavee & Bernard van den Berg, Putting Different Price Tags on the Same Health
Condition: Re-Evaluating the Well-Being Valuation Approach, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 1032 (2011).
12. An increase in income by cG/cy dollars produces cy(cG/cy) = cG increase in happiness, and
thus is the equivalent, in happiness terms, of an increase in exposure to the good by 1 unit.
Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur have recently proposed that policies be evaluated
via “well-being analysis” (WBA), whereby policy impacts, including income changes, would be
converted into happiness units. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Welfare as Happiness,
supra note 10, at 1627–40; Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Well-Being Analysis, supra note
10, at Part II. Although this proposal has some similarities to the use of SWB data to calculate
monetary equivalents for nonmarket goods, it differs from the latter in important respects. First,
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur adopt the “experience-quality” (EQ) defense of SWB
surveys, indeed the strong EQ defense—to use a distinction I will develop later in the Article,
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Substantial scholarly work along these lines has been
undertaken, using SWB data to estimate monetary equivalents for
various goods and bads—including air quality, airport noise, other
environmental goods, the death of family members, social
relationships, exposure to the risk of crime or terrorism, and
unemployment.
Second, scholars have worked toward developing an SWBsurvey-based index of social condition akin to gross domestic product
13
(GDP). (The desire to develop such an index is, in part, what has
motivated Kahneman’s research.) The idea here is to have a measure
14
of individual happiness that can be added across persons. We could
then estimate the gross national happiness or average happiness of a
country at a given time. We could also look at time trends in
gross/average happiness, characterize international or inter-group
differences in gross/average happiness, and use such a measure to
assess particular policies by predicting the change in gross/average
happiness that these policies would yield.
Governments have also begun to gather SWB data and to initiate
serious bureaucratic and even political discussions about the
possibility of SWB-survey-based policymaking. The Kingdom of
Bhutan has long endorsed the concept of “Gross National

see infra Part I.C. They see WBA as a way to take account of the information that SWB surveys
provide about individuals’ experience utility. By contrast, scholars using the monetaryequivalent approach do not universally adopt the EQ defense, at least not explicitly so. One
possible reading of some of this scholarship is that it adopts the “preference-realization” (PR)
defense: that the monetary-equivalent approach is meant to be sensitive to the information
SWB surveys provide concerning preference utility. See infra Part I.C. Indeed, Part II discusses
the monetary-equivalent approach, at length, as a test case for the PR defense of SWB surveys.
Second, WBA requires cardinal happiness data; the monetary-equivalent approach
requires only ordinal data. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Well-Being Analysis, supra
note 10, at Part II.B.4; infra Part II.A.3. Finally, WBA neutralizes wealth effects, whereas (in
principle) the monetary-equivalent approach does not. To see this point, imagine that some
nonmarket good has the very same effect on SWB for both rich and poor, and that money has a
diminishing incremental effect. Then WBA will be neutral between a policy that provides the
good for free to some number of rich individuals and one that does so for the same number of
poor individuals, taxing some third population, whereas the monetary-equivalent approach will
(in principle) favor the first policy.
13. See generally MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS, supra note 4;
Diener & Seligman, supra note 10; Kahneman et al., supra note 10; Ruut Veenhoven, Happy
Life-Expectancy: A Comprehensive Measure of Quality-of-Life in Nations, 39 SOC. INDICATORS
RES. 1 (1996); Ruut Veenhoven & Wim Kalmijn, Inequality-Adjusted Happiness in Nations:
Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism Married in a New Index of Societal Performance, 6 J.
HAPPINESS STUD. 421 (2005).
14. For discussion of cardinality and ordinality, see infra Part II.A.3.
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Happiness” and has used it in guiding economic development. Until
recently, such happiness-oriented governance seemed highly
idiosyncratic. In 2008, however, the president of France, Nicholas
Sarkozy, commissioned the influential Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report to
investigate non-GDP measures of social welfare. The report
recommended (inter alia) SWB surveys:
Research has shown that it is possible to collect meaningful and
reliable data on subjective as well as objective well-being. Subjective
well-being encompasses different aspects (cognitive evaluations of
one’s life, happiness, satisfaction, positive emotions such as joy and
pride, and negative emotions such as pain and worry): each of them
should be measured separately to derive a more comprehensive
appreciation of people’s lives. Quantitative measures of these
subjective aspects hold the promise of delivering not just a good
measure of quality of life per se, but also a better understanding of
its determinants, reaching beyond people’s income and material
conditions. Despite the persistence of many unresolved issues, these
subjective measures provide important information about quality of
life. Because of this, the types of question that have proved their
value within small-scale and unofficial surveys should be included in
16
larger-scale surveys undertaken by official statistical offices.

The Cameron government in the United Kingdom has welcomed the
17
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report, and statistical bureaus in the United
18
Kingdom are now implementing a program of SWB surveys. This
also appears to be in the offing in France and in the United States.
But do SWB surveys really offer a new foundation for
governmental policy? In this Article, I critically interrogate the

15. See Winton Bates, Gross National Happiness, 23 ASIAN-PAC. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 12
(2009).
16. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, REPORT BY THE
COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
16 (2009), available at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf.
17. PAUL DOLAN, RICHARD LAYARD & ROBERT METCALFE, OFFICE FOR NAT’L STAT.,
MEASURING SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING FOR PUBLIC POLICY 3 (2011).
18. See PAUL DOLAN & ROBERT METCALFE, OFFICE FOR NAT’L STAT., COMPARING
MEASURES OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING AND VIEWS ABOUT THE ROLE THEY SHOULD PLAY
IN POLICY (2011); DOLAN ET AL., supra note 17 at 3; OFFICE FOR NAT’L STAT., FIRST ANNUAL
ONS EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING RESULTS (2012), available at
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_272294.pdf; SAM WALDRON, OFFICE FOR NAT’L STAT.,
MEASURING SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING IN THE UK (2010).
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normative recommendations of SWB researchers (and the Stiglitz19
Sen-Fitoussi report).
A key difficulty is a lack of rigor and care in handling relevant
normative concepts, such as “well-being,” “preference satisfaction,”
and “utility.” Relatedly, the SWB literature has largely failed to
engage with contemporary philosophical scholarship on well-being.
To be sure, this lack of engagement is reciprocal, and it is not
particularly surprising, given academic specialization. SWB research
has been spearheaded, as mentioned, by psychologists and empirically
minded economists. The standard methods of moral philosophers—
conceptual analysis, intuition-pumping via simple and unrealistic
thought experiments—are unfamiliar in these social-scientific realms.
But now that SWB scholarship has moved beyond the
boundaries of social science, from the explanatory to the normative—
to a posture of endorsing particular governmental policies, policyevaluation approaches, or SWB measures as the basis for such
approaches—its methods require supplementation too. A more
precise and nuanced engagement with different possible conceptions
of well-being is needed. This Article tries to exemplify, and in any
event seeks to encourage, such engagement.
Part I reviews the philosophical literature, seeking to clarify
crucial distinctions that are all too often blurred by SWB scholars:
between well-being and a particular, experientialist, conception of
well-being (for example, the view that well-being is just happiness);
between the satisfaction of someone’s preferences (how well actual
conditions in the world fit with her preference ranking) and the fact
that the individual feels satisfied; between utility in the traditional
economic sense, a measure of preference satisfaction, and experience
utility, a measure of the individual’s happiness, positive affects, or
feelings of satisfaction.

19. For other, important, critical work on SWB surveys, see the chapters by George
Loewenstein, William Nordhaus, and Erik Hurst in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING OF NATIONS, supra note 4; MARC FLEURBAEY & DIDIER BLANCHET, BEYOND GDP:
MEASURING WELFARE AND ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at
ch. 5) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Daniel M. Hausman, Hedonism and Welfare
Economics, 26 ECON. & PHIL. 321 (2010); Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the
Ambiguities of “Welfare,” 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 391 (2005); George Loewenstein & Peter A.
Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J.
PUB. ECON. 1795 (2008); Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science
of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. 553 (2010); and Marc Fleurbaey, Erik Schockkaert & Koen Decancq,
What Good Is Happiness? (Ctr. for Operations Res. & Econometrics, Discussion Paper No. 17,
2009).

ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/15/2013 2:56 PM

HAPPINESS SURVEYS AND PUBLIC POLICY

1519

Part I concludes by differentiating two quite distinct roles that
SWB surveys might play as inputs to policy choice. First, a SWB
survey might evidence the degree to which an individual’s preferences
are satisfied. I will term this the “preference-realization” (PR)
defense of SWB surveys. Let it be understood (a point I will repeat
below) that, on a standard preference-based account of well-being,
the fundamental arguments for an individual’s preferences—what she
intrinsically prefers and disprefers—might well include items external
to her mind, such as her physical health, her accumulation of material
goods, her freedom and autonomy, her accomplishments, and so
forth. Second, an SWB survey might indicate the quality of an
individual’s mental states. It might tell us whether her mental states
are good or bad in some sense, for example, whether she feels happy
or distressed. I call a normative defense of SWB surveys predicated
on this role the “experience-quality” (EQ) defense.
Kahneman, clearly and decisively, presses the EQ defense. He
sees a (properly constructed) SWB survey as indicating whether the
individual is currently experiencing a positive or negative affective
state and, in either event, how intense it is. Other researchers,
however, seem to see SWB surveys as evidence of preference
realization. Still others offer both defenses, often without
acknowledging that the two involve quite different accounts of what
information SWB surveys are supposed to be providing.
The distinction between PR and EQ defenses of the policy
relevance of SWB data clarifies normative discussion. It is a
distinction with a difference—a distinction that SWB scholars would
do well to notice—and a distinction that will serve as the organizing
template for this Article. In Part II, I consider, and reject, the PR
defense. In Part III, I consider the EQ defense—here drawing a
further line between “strong” and “weak” variants. The strong
variant of the EQ defense, adopted by Richard Layard in his
20
influential book on happiness, adopts an experientialist view of wellbeing. Experientialism about well-being is a controversial view. It
says that, necessarily, an individual is equally well-off in two
outcomes if she has the same mental states in both (even if the
condition of her physical body, or facts about the wider world, are
different in the two outcomes).

20. LAYARD, supra note 10. For a description and critique of Layard’s views, see infra Part
III.A.
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The weak variant of the EQ defense, now favored by Kahneman,
acknowledges the possibility of nonexperiential constituents of wellbeing, but stresses that happiness or, more generally, mental states,
21
are at least one important aspect of human flourishing. The weak
EQ defense is by far the most plausible basis for incorporating SWB
data into policy analysis. Even this defense of the policy relevance of
SWB surveys, however, is vulnerable to substantial criticisms. I will
flesh out these criticisms via a close analysis of Kahneman’s work.
Part III will conclude by articulating a different methodology for
taking account of the impact of governmental policies on individuals’
mental states, a methodology that does not rely upon SWB surveys.
The aims of the Article, thus, are both conceptual and
substantive. First, it articulates distinctions that are useful in thinking
carefully about the normative relevance of SWB surveys—above all,
the distinction between PR and EQ defenses. Second, it argues
substantively that neither the PR defense nor the EQ defense, in even
its weak form, is convincing. The second aspect of the Article is
separable from the first. Even if the reader is not persuaded by my
various critiques of SWB surveys, she will still agree (I hope) that it is
vital to differentiate the potential role of SWB surveys as evidence of
preference utility (the PR defense) from their role as evidence of
22
experience utility (the EQ defense).

21. See infra notes 177–178 and accompanying text.
22. I am grateful to Carol Graham for writing a commentary on this Article. Carol
Graham, An Economist’s Perspective on Well-Being Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62
DUKE L.J. 1691 (2013). Graham distinguishes between two types of SWB surveys: hedonic wellbeing (HWB) surveys (which seek to measure individuals’ affects) and evaluative well-being
(EWB) surveys (which seek to measure how individuals evaluate their lives). Id. at 1692–93. To
be clear, my intention in this Article is not to defend HWB surveys as contrasted with EWB
surveys. Part II focuses on life-satisfaction surveys (a kind of EWB survey) as a comparatively
more plausible indicator of preference utility than happiness surveys—but my aim in
undertaking the analysis of Part II is to demonstrate that the PR defense with respect to SWB
surveys of any kind is problematic. (Because EWB surveys fail in that role, as Part II shows,
then a fortiori HWB surveys do.) Part III, in discussing the weak EQ defense, focuses on
Kahneman’s “objective happiness” framework. It does so because Kahneman’s work is the most
fully developed version of the weak EQ defense. As it happens, “objective happiness” relies on
HWB surveys (asking about momentary affects) rather than EWB surveys. I do not mean to
suggest that the weak EQ approach is best fleshed out by focusing wholly on affects, and indeed
I criticize Kahneman for doing just that. See infra Part III.B.5.
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I. PREFERENCES, EXPERIENCES, AND THE NORMATIVE ROLE OF
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING SURVEYS
Section A of this Part clarifies some important well-being
concepts. A key distinction is that between experientialist and
nonexperientialist conceptions of well-being. A preference-based
conception of well-being falls in the nonexperientialist category
because an individual can hold an intrinsic preference for items other
than her own experiences. For example, she might prefer to be in
good health, to have children, or to attain various goals she has set for
herself, as such, rather than merely preferring the experiences that
flow from health, children, or goal fulfillment.
Section B looks at the empirical evidence regarding individuals’
intrinsic preferences for nonexperiential items. If such preferences
were empirically rare, policy-analysis tools might safely ignore them.
But the available evidence does not demonstrate that this is the case.
Finally, building upon the conceptual tools set forth here, Section
C differentiates between PR (preference-realization) and EQ
(experience-quality) defenses of the policy role of SWB surveys.
A. Well-Being, Happiness, Preference, Experience, and Utility: Some
Clarifications
In an article published in the prestigious Economic Journal,
Richard Easterlin—who pioneered the use of SWB data in
economics—writes, “Throughout this article, I use the terms
happiness, subjective well-being, satisfaction, utility, well-being, and
23
welfare interchangeably.” For anyone acquainted with the vibrant
contemporary philosophical literature on welfare, Easterlin’s
equivalences—and similar conflations drawn throughout the SWB
24
literature —are unsettling. Imagine how a labor or financial
23. Richard A. Easterlin, Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory, 111 ECON. J.
465, 465 (2001).
24. See, e.g., DIENER ET AL., supra note 10, at 9–12 (suggesting that “economic theories of
well-being equate well-being with utility,” that “economists define utility as the satisfaction that
a person experiences from the consumption of goods,” and that the authors’ proposed
subjective definition of well-being, in terms of individuals’ favorable self-evaluations, is
“essentially identical to economists’ concept of utility”); FREY, supra note 1, at 3 (“In
general, . . . as in the literature, the terms ‘happiness’, ‘well-being’, and ‘life satisfaction’ are used
interchangeably.”); David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being over Time in
Britain and the USA, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1359, 1360–62 (2004) (using well-being, happiness, and
utility as equivalent terms); Diener & Seligman, supra note 10, at 1 (defining “[w]ell-being” as
“peoples’ positive evaluations of their lives”); Andrew J. Oswald, Happiness and Economic
Performance, 107 ECON. J. 1815, 1815 (1997) (leaping from the premise that economic
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economist would react to the statement, “I use the terms income,
consumption, and wealth interchangeably.”
Academic philosophers writing about well-being standardly draw
a series of distinctions that I will now articulate. Are these distinctions
“right” or “true” or “correct” in some foundational sense? Maybe
not. For purely predictive or explanatory purposes, it might be
perfectly appropriate to equate “happiness, subjective well-being,
25
satisfaction, utility, well-being, and welfare,” as Easterlin does. And
asserting the “correctness,” for normative purposes, of a scheme that
disaggregates well-being, happiness, preference satisfaction, and
utility—a
disaggregation
commonplace
in
contemporary
26
philosophical writing about welfare —implicates contested
metaethical questions that I am quite happy (!) to avoid here.
I will observe, however, that academic philosophers—the
scholarly community engaged in serious, longstanding, normative
debates about well-being—have found it useful to deploy a certain
vocabulary. This has served to make precise plausible normative
views. And it seems pretty risky for SWB scholars, now also engaged
in normative debates, to ignore the vocabulary or to dumb it down.
First, philosophers typically recognize that there is a plurality of
accounts of well-being. One such account sees an individual’s wellbeing as based upon various objective goods. Another equates wellbeing and preference attainment. A third account, the hedonic
account, dating back to Jeremy Bentham, says that an individual’s

performance has no intrinsic normative significance, to the conclusion that “[e]conomic things
matter only in so far as they make people happier”); Carol D. Ryff & Burton H. Singer, Know
Thyself and Become What You Are: A Eudaimonic Approach to Psychological Well-Being, 9 J.
HAPPINESS STUD. 13, 14–15 (2008) (viewing Aristotelian “eudaimonia” as a kind of
psychological state, namely “psychological well-being”); Bernard M.S. van Praag, Perspectives
from the Happiness Literature and the Role of New Instruments for Policy Analysis, 53 CESIFO
ECON. STUD. 42, 42 & n.1 (2007) (assuming that “economic behaviour . . . is motivated by
maximization of utility, satisfaction, well-being or happiness” and noting that “[w]e will make
no difference between these notions”). For further examples of SWB scholars using the
concepts of well-being, subjective well-being, and/or happiness as equivalent, see Erik Angner,
Are Subjective Measures of Well-Being ‘Direct’?, 89 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 115, 119–20 (2011).
25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, PREFERENCE, VALUE, CHOICE, AND WELFARE 77–81
(2012); DANIEL M. HAYBRON, THE PURSUIT OF UNHAPPINESS: THE ELUSIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF
WELL-BEING 29–42 (2008); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 81–98 (1996);
Erik Angner, Subjective Well-Being, 39 J. SOCIO-ECON. 361, 362–63 (2010).
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welfare depends upon her pains and pleasures. And there are further
27
possibilities.
Choosing between these accounts is a matter for substantive
normative argument. Purely semantical or definitional considerations
will not suffice to vindicate one account. Sheer reflection on the
meaning of the word “well-being” will not establish, for example, that
a preference-based view of well-being is correct, and that those who
espouse competing views are in error. Instead, the proponent of any
particular account will need to bring into play the ordinary tools of
normative debate: showing that this account has intuitively appealing
results for particular cases, that it fits with more general principles
that seem attractive, and so forth.
Second, philosophers categorize the plurality of accounts of wellbeing in various ways (with such categorization seen as illuminating
normative debate). One such categorization is binary, demarcating
between accounts that make an individual’s well-being wholly
dependent upon the quality of her mental states, and accounts that do
not have this feature. I will make this demarcation precise by
distinguishing between experientialist and nonexperientialist accounts
of welfare:
Experientialist versus Nonexperientialist Accounts of
Well-Being: A Definition
An experientialist account of well-being satisfies the
following requirement: if a given individual’s mental
states (her beliefs, affects, memories, desires, and all
other aspects of her mental states) in outcome x are
identical to her mental states in outcome y, and
28
outcomes x and y are maximally specified, then the
27. For an overview of the philosophical literature on well-being, see MATTHEW D.
ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 158–85
(2012).
28. An “outcome” is a possible state of affairs: a description of some aspect of the world,
which might possibly occur or have occurred in the past, present, and/or future. A maximally
specified outcome is what philosophers term a “possible world,” namely an outcome F such that
for every other F* either F entails F* or F entails not-F*. In effect, a maximally specified
outcome is a complete history of the universe, leaving no possible occurrence undetermined.
Of course, maximally specified outcomes are not items that humans can hold in
consciousness. In particular, human policy analysts cannot use maximally specified outcomes to
think about policy impacts. Rather, maximally specified outcomes are theoretical constructs that
serve various theoretical purposes. For example, they help to categorize different accounts of
well-being. An experientialist account says that the quality of an individual’s experiences is the
only intrinsic determinant of her well-being; changes in nonexperiential items can cause changes
in well-being, but do not change it directly. This feature of experientialism is made precise by
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individual is equally well-off in both outcomes. A
nonexperientialist account is any account that fails to
satisfy
the
experientialism
requirement.
(A
nonexperientialist account says that it is possible for
there to be an individual, i, and maximally specified
outcomes x and y, such that i is better off in x than y
even though all of the individual’s mental states are
the same in the two outcomes.)
A hedonic account of well-being is experientialist in the sense
defined here. Assume that all aspects of a given individual’s mental
states are identical in (maximally specified) outcomes x and y. Then,
in particular, her pain sensations in x are identical to her pain
sensations in y. And her pleasure sensations in x are identical to her
pleasure sensations in y. If so, someone who adopts a hedonic
conception of welfare will say that the individual is equally well-off in
the two outcomes.
The hedonic account is not the sole member of the class of
experientialist views. A richer account, also experientialist, says that
an individual’s well-being depends not only upon her pains and
pleasures, but also upon her attainment of high quality nonhedonic
mental states (for example, having good memories, cognitions, or
perceptions) and her avoidance of low quality nonhedonic mental
29
states. It is easy to see why this richer account is still experientialist
as per the above definition. Assume that all aspects of an individual’s
mental life are identical in (maximally specified) outcomes x and y:
her pains and pleasures and her memories, cognitions, perceptions,

the definition in the text only if x and y are maximally specified. Even an experientialist account
might allow the welfare ranking of partially described outcomes to be a partial function of
nonmental attributes (given their causal role).
For example, assume that outcomes are partially described to specify an individual’s
income and how much pain or pleasure she feels, but not the nonhedonic aspects of her mental
life (for example, her sense of life satisfaction or the quality of her memories). Assume that
individual i’s pains and pleasures are the same in x and y, but that she has more income in x.
Then someone who reduces well-being to pains/pleasures and a sense of life satisfaction—a kind
of sophisticated experientialist account—might say that individual i is better off in x than y
despite the fact that all of i’s specified mental attributes are identical in x and y. Having greater
income might cause a change in unspecified, well-being-relevant mental attributes, namely, a
sense of life satisfaction.
By contrast, if x and y are fully specified, the causal upshots of any nonmental attribute
that an individual might possess are already “built into” the description of the outcomes, and so
the only reason for a difference in some nonmental attribute to yield a difference in well-being
is because of the attribute’s intrinsic welfare significance.
29. See infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
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and so forth. Then, even on the account which says that well-being is
a matter of attaining pleasure and high-quality nonhedonic states, and
avoiding pain and low-quality nonhedonic states, the individual is
equally well-off in the two outcomes.
The concept of “happiness” is standardly (although perhaps not
30
invariably) specified in experientialist terms. If an individual’s
affects and cognitions and everything else about her mental life are
identical in two outcomes, then it must be the case that she is equally
happy in both. Happiness (however more precisely defined) is “in the
head”—at least on the standard view.
It thus follows that “well-being” and “happiness” are distinct
concepts. There is nothing conceptually incoherent in acknowledging
that happiness satisfies the experientialism requirement, while
simultaneously adopting a nonexperientialist account of welfare,
which says that well-being does not satisfy this requirement. Again,
nonexperientialism about well-being might be substantively
unattractive—it might lose out after normative debate—but such an
account is in no way confused or incoherent regarding the very
meaning of “well-being.”
What, then, are important examples of nonexperientialist
accounts of welfare? “Objective good” accounts posit a plurality of
well-being goods that include but are not limited to good mental
states, and that are seen as having some basis other than an
individual’s preferences. Such accounts are nonexperientialist.
Consider, for example, Martha Nussbaum’s well-known list of human
31
“capabilities,” a modern exemplar of the objective-good approach.
The list includes: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; the senses,
imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other
species; play; and control over one’s environment. Note that a few of
these items individually satisfy the experientialism requirement, but
that others do not (and thus the overall account does not either).
Contrast, for example, emotions and body health.
It is straightforward that an objective-good account of welfare
falls within the category of nonexperientialist accounts. A more subtle
point—and one absolutely central to this Article—is that preference-

30. See HAYBRON, supra note 26, at 30.
31. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 78–80 (2000); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Who Is the Happy Warrior?
Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S81 (2008) (critically evaluating
proposals to orient policy around SWB).
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based accounts are also nonexperientialist. A preference-based
account ascribes to a given individual i a ranking Ri of outcomes.
Depending on the account, Ri might be i’s actual preferences, or Ri
might be “laundered” in various ways. In either event, what makes Ri
a “preference” ranking is (1) that Ri is minimally well-behaved (in
particular, it is transitive), and (2) that Ri is connected to individual i’s
choices. The preference-based view then says that one outcome is
better than a second outcome for individual i if and only if the first
outcome is ranked higher by Ri.
The “arguments” for an individual’s preference ranking are the
features of outcomes that move them up or down in the ranking. We
can further distinguish between an individual’s intrinsic preferences
and her instrumental preferences. I intrinsically prefer something if I
want it for its own sake; I instrumentally prefer something if I want it
because I believe it helps me advance my intrinsic preferences. For
example, I might have an intrinsic goal to sail around the world, and
want to be healthy not because I care about health as such, but
because being healthy will enable me to fulfill this goal. I will use the
term “fundamental argument” to mean the features of outcomes that
an individual intrinsically prefers.
And now we can see why a preference-based account of wellbeing does not satisfy the experientialism requirement. On such a
view, it is quite possible that the fundamental arguments for
individual i’s preferences include features of outcomes other than
individual i’s mental states. If so, individual i can be better off in one
(maximally specified) outcome than in a second even though his
mental states are identical in the two outcomes.
Understand that my intention is simply to explain what a
preference-based view of well-being involves. I am not arguing, here,
in favor of such a view, as opposed to a hedonic account or some
32
other account within the experientialist family. My aim, at this
32. I have elsewhere endorsed a preference-based view of well-being. See MATTHEW D.
ADLER & ERIC. A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 25–61 (2006);
ADLER, supra note 27, at 155–231. And the discussion in Part III.C—suggesting a methodology
for incorporating information about experiential quality into policy—does presuppose that a
preference-based view is more attractive than competing views. However, the remainder of the
Article does not commit itself to this view. The nature of well-being is contested, and this Article
hopes to address a wider readership than persuaded preferentialists. The aim of this Part is
clarificatory: to bring to light distinctions between the various well-being accounts that are often
obscured in the SWB literature. Part II argues that a potential defense of SWB surveys, in light
of a preference-based view (the PR defense), is unpersuasive. This is an argument about the
relation between the preference-based view and SWB surveys—not a defense of that view. Part
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juncture, is simply to articulate the demarcation set forth by the
experientialism requirement and to clarify that preference-based
views fall on the nonexperientialist side of that demarcation.
The point can be further clarified by introducing the concept of a
utility function. A utility function, in traditional economics, is a realvalued mathematical function ui(.), which represents the preference
33
ranking Ri of individual i. Under standard technical conditions, Ri
will be thus representable, so that outcome x is ranked higher by Ri
than outcome y if and only if ui(x) > ui(y).
If outcomes are maximally specified, the fundamental arguments
for an individual’s preferences are the entries in her utility function.
Let us assume for the moment—simply to facilitate the exposition—
that outcomes are maximally specified. We can now see very easily
why a preference-based view is not experientialist. Why? It is possible
that i’s utility function takes the form ui(Mi, Ni) where Mi denotes
facts about i’s mental states (her pains and pleasures, memories,
cognitions, and so forth), and Ni are other facts about individual i or
the wider world. If two outcomes are identical with respect to the Mi
facts but not with respect to the Ni facts, individual i’s utility function
may assign a different number to the two outcomes. This will indicate
that the outcomes are not ranked equally by Ri; and a preferencebased view will then say that the individual is not equally well-off in
the outcomes, thus violating the experientialism requirement.
In actual practice, economists and policy analysts do not work
with maximally specified outcomes (which are cognitively
intractable). The analytical nexus between the fundamental
arguments for an individual’s preferences (the items she intrinsically
prefers or disprefers) and the entries in her utility function becomes
more complex. Where outcomes are not maximally specified, a utility
function of the form ui(Mi, Ni) or ui(Ni)—where Ni are nonmental
facts—might just mean that i has an instrumental preference
regarding those facts. The individual prefers various nonmental
occurrences because they will cause her to have various experiences.
It is also possible, however, that i has an intrinsic preference
regarding nonmental features of the world and that a utility function
of the form ui(Mi, Ni) or ui(Ni) is capturing this intrinsic preference.
III.A criticizes experientialism about well-being—but note that “objective good” as well as
preference-based views reject experientialism.
33. See HAUSMAN, supra note 26, at 13–14; ANDREU MAS-COLLEL, MICHAEL D.
WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 6–9, 46–50 (7th prtg. 2009).
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One objection, pressed by readers of early drafts of this Article,
is that it does not “make sense” for preferences to have non-mentalstate fundamental arguments. In traditional consumer theory, the
inputs to an individual’s utility function are the physical quantities of
various kinds of goods that an individual possesses and consumes
(physically interacts with). Now, it might be objected that an intrinsic
preference to possess and consume various goods embodies an
irrational consumption fetishism. Someone might plausibly have an
instrumental preference to consume bundle C rather than C*,
believing that consuming the first bundle will cause her to experience
more happiness than consuming the second. But to prefer bundle C as
such—independent of any belief that having C will lead to different
34
experiences than C*—seems unintelligible.
To think carefully about this objection, we should have in view
the different kinds of preference-based accounts, that is, the different
35
ways in which preferences might be “laundered.” One kind of view
requires simply that preferences satisfy formal rationality conditions
(either the minimum requirements constitutive of a preference, or
additional requirements). But formal rationality conditions clearly
permit preferences with non-mental-state fundamental arguments.
For example, someone might well have a transitive, complete,
continuous, convex, monotonic, and otherwise formally well-behaved
36
ranking of consumption bundles.
A more fully “laundered” account requires that preferences be
“intelligible”: that they “make sense,” rather than merely satisfy
formal rationality conditions. Although intrinsic preferences for
consumption bundles, or for income, may well fail this requirement,
there are various other kinds of intrinsic preferences for nonmental
37
items that seem perfectly intelligible. (1) Health. Health economists
typically include an individual’s health (meaning not merely her
34. Amartya Sen famously argues for a closely related proposition, namely that social
assessment should focus on the achieved “functionings” that are caused by income together with
individuals’ physical and social attributes, or opportunities to function, and not income itself.
E.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 28–30 (1992); see also Amartya Sen,
Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 41 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen
eds., 1993) (“Since income is not desired for its own sake, any income-based notion of poverty
must refer—directly or indirectly—to those basic ends which are produced by income as
means.”).
35. See ADLER, supra note 27, at 170–72.
36. See MAS-COLLEL ET AL., supra note 33, at 41–50.
37. See Dan Moller, Wealth, Disability, and Happiness, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 177, 186–89
(2011).
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mental health, but also the physical integrity and functioning of her
38
body) as one of the entries in her utility function. Although this
functional structure could merely be capturing an instrumental
preference for health, an intrinsic desire to be healthy also seems
intelligible—no less so than an intrinsic preference for certain affects,
39
cognitions, or memories. Jim desires not to feel pain; Jane desires
not to have a limb amputated (independent of whatever pain limb
loss causes). Where is the argument that Jim’s desires make sense but
Jane’s desires do not? (2) Liberty. Having more liberties may reduce
40
the quality of someone’s experiences. For example, more liberties
might cause more frustration at unrealized expectations, or more time
41
spent agonizing over choices. Still, an individual might view liberty
as an aspect of personhood; she might intrinsically prefer to increase
her liberties “because that’s what autonomy means,” even
recognizing the uncertain or negative experiential impact of this
increase. (3) Goal fulfillment. Individuals, as they grow to adulthood,
develop a wide range of life goals: to have a particular kind of career;
to develop mastery of a particular sport, musical instrument, or art
form; to travel to certain places; to learn some body of knowledge; to
make an impact on the community in a certain way; and so forth.
Surely someone can intelligibly defend her preference for fulfilling
some particular life goal by saying, “This is just what I’ve always
wanted to do, and have worked for years to accomplish.” And, if that
were not enough, she could add, “What is it to be an autonomous
person, but to develop and pursue life goals?” It would be astonishing

38. See Béatrice Rey & Jean-Charles Rochet, Health and Wealth: How Do They Affect
Individual Preferences?, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. THEORY 43, 44–46 (2004).
39. For a review of evidence that individuals have an intrinsic preference for health, see
infra notes 76–84 and accompanying text; see also Carol Graham, Happiness and Health:
Lessons—and Questions—for Public Policy, 27 HEALTH AFF. 72, 73–74 (2008) (reviewing
evidence showing imperfect correlation between health and happiness); Carol Graham, Lucas
Higuera & Eduardo Lora, Which Health Conditions Cause the Most Unhappiness?, 20 HEALTH
ECON. 1431, 1432–33 (2011) (same); Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering
Awards: They Shouldn’t Be (Just) About Pain and Suffering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S195 (2008)
(arguing for the intelligibility of an intrinsic preference not to be physically injured).
40. See Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, The Paradox of Declining Female Happiness, 1
AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 190, 191 (2009) (finding declining female happiness during a period
of increased labor market opportunities and other options for women).
41. See Carol Graham & Stefano Pettinato, Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers and
Subjective Well-Being in New Market Economies, J. DEV. STUD., Apr. 2002, at 100, 117–20
(providing evidence of “frustrated achievers”: upward income mobility shifts income
expectations and reduces happiness). See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF
CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004).
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if the only sensible explanation for why someone might want to
master cello, to become an airplane pilot, or to climb Mount Everest
were because of what those accomplishments would make her feel,
think, or remember. (4) Knowledge. Personhood involves both
“practical rationality” (the capacity to form and act upon goals) and
42
“theoretical rationality” (the capacity to acquire knowledge).
Aristotle thought that the exercise of theoretical rationality was the
43
highest form of human well-being. Whether or not this is true, it is
certainly intelligible to have an intrinsic preference for knowledge, a
preference to believe true propositions. But note that the degree to
which someone possesses knowledge is not a wholly experiential fact
about her. It depends both upon what she believes, and whether what
she believes is true, that is, whether it corresponds to facts in the
44
world. (5) Relationships. Just as someone might intelligibly see her
status as a human being as the basis for an intrinsic preference for
physical health; and her status as an autonomous person as the basis
for an intrinsic preference to possess various liberties, to develop and
fulfill various life-goals, or to possess knowledge; so, too, someone
might see her status as a social animal as justifying intrinsic
preferences for having friendships, for being a parent, or for having
other kinds of relationships. In fact, the existing evidence from SWB
45
surveys does not establish that parenthood increases SWB. If
someone believes that being a parent will, on balance, produce some
decrease in his happiness and feelings of satisfaction, but still prefers
to be a parent, is his preference necessarily unintelligible?
Robert Nozick’s famous discussion of the “experience machine”
is relevant, here:

42. THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 38–41 (1993); see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
NATURAL RIGHTS 59–80 (1980) (arguing for the intrinsic value of knowledge); George
Loewenstein, That Which Makes Life Worthwhile, in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING OF NATIONS, supra note 4, at 87, 96–97 (same).
43. Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Mar.
29, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics.
44. Moreover, knowledge may not produce happiness or life satisfaction. For evidence that
SWB need not increase with education, see Dolan et al., supra note 1, at 99–100; and Joop
Hartog & Hessel Oosterbeek, Health, Wealth and Happiness: Why Pursue a Higher Education?,
17 ECON. EDUC. REV. 245, 251–54 (1998).
45. See Dolan et al., supra note 1, at 107 (finding mixed evidence of SWB impact of having
children); Thomas Hansen, Parenthood and Happiness: A Review of Folk Theories Versus
Empirical Evidence, 108 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 29, 44 (2012) (finding that resident children
tend to reduce SWB).
AND

ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/15/2013 2:56 PM

HAPPINESS SURVEYS AND PUBLIC POLICY

1531

Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any
experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were
writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting
book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes
attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life,
preprogramming your life’s experiences? If you are worried about
missing out on desirable experiences, we can suppose that business
enterprises have researched thoroughly the lives of many others.
You can pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of
46
such experiences . . . . Would you plug in?

My intrinsic preference for some nonmental state of affairs is a
preference that this state of affairs actually occur and not merely a
preference that I believe (perhaps falsely) in such occurrence and
have the feelings caused by this belief (perhaps false). If Tim
intrinsically prefers to be in good health, then what Tim wants is
actually to be free of diseases, not merely to believe that he is diseasefree. If Sarah intrinsically prefers to have a loving and faithful spouse,
then what Sarah prefers is a spouse who actually loves her, not merely
one who succeeds in persuading her that he does (but cheats behind
her back). If Emily wants to be an airline pilot, then what she prefers
is a complex state of affairs including her own physical movements
(that she actually move through the air by piloting an aircraft) and
social recognition (that she be recognized by others as a pilot), and
not merely that she believe all this. What Nozick’s “experience
machine” underscores is that some such preferences are perfectly
intelligible.
More specifically, what seems intelligible is a preference
structure with both nonmental and mental fundamental arguments. In
wanting a good marriage, what I want is (1) a certain kind of
relationship (including my spouse actually loving me, being faithful,
and so forth, as opposed to my being deceived on this score), and (2)
47
being aware of, and made happy by, this relationship. A preference
just to have a certain kind of relationship—wholly independent of
how happy or miserable it makes me feel—does seem quite odd. In
general, it does seem quite odd for someone to be wholly indifferent
46. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42–43 (1974).
47. Cf. SUMNER, supra note 26, at 139 (analyzing well-being as “authentic happiness,”
where authenticity requires inter alia that the individual be factually well-informed); Shelly
Kagan, Well-Being as Enjoying the Good, 23 PHIL. PERSP. 253, 255 (2009) (suggesting that wellbeing may consist of taking pleasure in the attainment of objective goods).
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to her own happiness, pains and pleasures, memories, cognitions, or
other mental states. But that is not the issue here. Rather, I am trying
to show how a preference-based view of well-being violates the
experientialism requirement. It is intelligible to have preferences with
hybrid fundamental arguments: for some person to care intrinsically
that (1) certain nonmental facts occur, and (2) that she have certain
beliefs, memories, cognitions, or feelings as a result of those nonmental facts.
The ranking of outcomes in light of such hybrid preferences does
not satisfy the experientialism requirement because the preferences
have nonmental as well as mental fundamental arguments. And an
intelligibility constraint on preferences—at a minimum—will surely
allow some such hybrid preferences. It follows that a preferencebased view of well-being—even if it incorporates an intelligibility
constraint—is nonexperientialist.
Yet a different kind of laundering requires fully informed
preferences. But there is no reason to think that fully informed
preferences must satisfy the experientialism requirement any more
than to think that intelligible preferences must.
So much for the objection that properly laundered preferences
(preferences that are formally rational, intelligible, and/or fully
informed) must satisfy the experientialism requirement. A second
objection to my characterization of preference-based accounts of
well-being as nonexperientialist might be articulated as follows:
“Someone’s preferences are relevant to her well-being only if those
preferences are self-interested. And a self-interest constraint, properly
understood, does require that preferences satisfy the experientialism
requirement.” I will postpone discussion of this objection until later in
48
the Article. To anticipate that discussion: although an experientialist
conception of “self-interested” has some plausibility, I believe that
the preferentialist should reject it. This conception is
counterintuitively narrow, and lacks a theoretical warrant, except on
a controversial view about personal identity.
In sum, an individual’s preferences—even her laundered, selfinterested preferences—can have nonmental fundamental arguments.
And thus preference-based accounts of well-being, like objectivegood accounts—and unlike accounts that reduce well-being to
pains/pleasures, to happiness, or to richer packages of affects,

48. See infra Part III.A.
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cognitions, memories, perceptions, and/or other types of mental
states—constitute nonexperientialist conceptions of human welfare.
Some readers might remain puzzled by my characterization of
preference-based views as nonexperientialist. These readers might
think: “A preference is itself a kind of mental state. If individual i’s
well-being depends upon his preferences, then his well-being depends
upon his mental states. So how can a preference-based account of
well-being be nonexperientialist?”
Of course, someone’s preferences are one aspect of her mental
states. It would be absurd to say otherwise. However, preferencebased views are nonexperientialist in the specific sense expressed by
the experientialism requirement. That requirement is framed to
capture an important feature of well-being accounts, one that is
highly relevant to normative debates about them. If an account fails
the experientialism requirement, then it is possible to directly change
someone’s well-being without changing any of his mental states. And
indeed this is true of preference-based accounts. Imagine that
individual i has the very same preferences, Ri, in (maximally
specified) outcomes x and y; that Ri has nonmental fundamental
arguments Ni as well as mental fundamental arguments Mi; that the
individual’s mental states are identical in the two outcomes (not just
his preferences, but his pains and pleasures, cognitions, memories,
and everything else about his mental states); but that outcome x is
ranked by Ri above outcome y because the Ni facts are different. Then
this is a case where i prefers x to y, and is better off in x than in y
according to a preference-based view, even though everything about
his mental states in the two outcomes (including his preferences) are
49
identical.

49. A different objection is that any person j whose preferences have non-mental-state
fundamental arguments can be mimicked by a “doppelganger” j* who cares only about her
mental states. In particular, whenever j intrinsically prefers nonmental fact F, j* has an intrinsic
preference concerning her beliefs; namely, j* prefers that she believe F. Thus, policy modelers
can ignore the possibility of preferences with non-mental-state fundamental arguments—instead
“translating” apparent intrinsic preferences for nonexperiential items into intrinsic preferences
for the corresponding beliefs.
But one implication of Nozick’s “experience machine” example is that j and j* will not
necessarily make identical choices. If the machine will cause the false belief F, then j* might
enter the machine while j refuses. Moreover, third parties might act very differently toward j
and j*. If j prefers to have a faithful spouse, and a friend observes that j’s spouse is unfaithful,
then the friend might tell j but not do the same in j*’s case. If j wants to be in good physical
health, the government might fund certain health interventions that it would not fund in the
case of j*, who simply wants to believe she is in good health.
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To say that someone’s preferences can have non-mental-state
fundamental arguments is not to say that they must. There is nothing
in the preference-based account of welfare to require that someone
intrinsically care about items other than her own mental states. But,
conversely, the view does not prohibit her from doing so. What
someone prefers, and thus what improves her well-being, is for her to
determine. On a preference-based account of welfare, it is possible for
someone—possible, if she has an intrinsic preference for health,
liberty, goal fulfillment, knowledge, relationships, or other nonmental
features of outcomes—to be directly benefited or harmed without any
change in her mental states, by virtue of events that change the Ni
facts but not the Mi facts.
Unfortunately, this feature of preference-based views is not
always well-understood by researchers in the SWB literature. One
tendency in this literature is to adopt an experientialist account of
well-being without substantive normative argument. This tendency
assumes, from the get-go, that well-being is solely a matter of
attaining high quality mental states and avoiding low quality ones,
whether specified as pain/pleasure, happiness/unhappiness, feelings of
50
satisfaction, or in some other way.
In particular, SWB scholars too often assume that individuals’
51
intrinsic preferences must be for mental items. But to do this is to
misunderstand the antipaternalism that constitutes an attraction of
the preference-based account. For the preferentialist, the extent to
which an individual’s welfare covaries with her experiences, as
opposed to covarying with nonexperiential facts about her (or the
wider world), is an empirical question—one to be resolved not by
scholarly stipulation or assumption, but only by looking to what the
individual prefers.
A related confusion concerns the meaning of “utility.” As
already explained, a preference is a ranking, and a utility function a
mathematical device for representing that ranking. Again, utility
function ui(.) represents individual i’s preferences, Ri, if the following
50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., FREY, supra note 1, at 5 (“[H]appiness is undoubtedly an overriding goal in
most people’s lives.”); LAYARD, supra note 10, at 124 (arguing that happiness-maximization
“values what people want for themselves, for their children and for their fellow citizens,”
namely “their happiness”); Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball & Alex ReesJones, What Do You Think Would Make You Happier? What Do You Think You Would
Choose?, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2083, 2107 (2012) (noting that the implicit view in much of the
economics of happiness literature is that SWB is the sole argument for idealized preferences).
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is true: whenever outcome x is ranked above outcome y by Ri, ui(x) >
ui(y).
An individual’s utility, in this sense, can change without any
change in an individual’s feelings, beliefs, or perceptions. If ui(.)
includes nonmental states as its entries, taking the form ui(Mi, Ni) or
ui(Ni), with Ni nonmental features of individual i or the wider world,
then individual i can have higher or lower utility in one outcome than
in a second outcome even though her beliefs, feelings, enjoyments,
and so forth, are exactly the same in both.
In particular, individual i’s actual utility—the numerical value
that ui(.) attaches to the actual outcome—can be higher or lower than
her utility in some counterfactual outcome without individual i being
aware of this. If Ri ranks x over y, and outcome x occurs, it does not
follow that individual i realizes that an outcome preferred to y has
occurred or realizes that her utility level is higher in the actual
outcome than if y had occurred. Think of Ri as an individualized
criterion for assessing and comparing different possible (more or less
completely specified) histories of the world. In general, i will not be
infallible about the extent to which the actual world matches up to
this criterion.
This is most clearly true if Ri has nonmental fundamental
arguments. Imagine that I prefer to be liked by my peers. In a world y
where they laugh behind my back, without my realizing it, I am lower
in the Ri ranking than in an otherwise identical world x where I am
genuinely liked, and my utility ui(y) is lower than utility ui(x); but if y
were to occur, I would not perceive that my utility is lower than ui(x).
Indeed, as discussed in the margin, even if the fundamental
arguments for Ri are just mental states, individual i will not generally
be infallible about his utility level; his beliefs and feelings about his
52
utility need not correspond to his actual utility level.

52. This can occur insofar as individuals incorrectly predict the causal impact of nonmental
attributes. Imagine that individual i cares only about his pains and pleasures. If x and y are
(incompletely specified) outcomes that describe individuals’ income, health, and various other
nonhedonic attributes, then it could be the case that ui(x) > ui(y), because i will end up with
more pleasure in x, but that i incorrectly believes his bundle of nonhedonic attributes in y will
cause him more pleasure. (This is just a kind of hedonic forecasting error.) In particular, an
individual who cares only about pains and pleasures might give an incorrect answer to a
question (such as the following) asking him to compare his preference-utility in the actual world
x to what his utility would be in y, given the counterfactual bundle of nonhedonic attributes
specified in y. “Consider your actual income and health. Is your preference-utility higher than it
would be if, instead, you had this level of health and this much income?”
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Economists and philosophers sometimes use the term
53
“satisfaction” with reference to a preference structure. Outcome x
better “satisfies” individual i’s preferences than y if x is ranked above
y by Ri. “Satisfaction,” in this sense, does not necessarily have an
experiential component: Joe’s preferences can be more fully satisfied
without Joe feeling more satisfied (for just the reasons discussed in
the previous two paragraphs). Of course, in ordinary English, the
word “satisfy” does have affective connotations, and so instead I will
use the term “realization” or “attainment” to mean movement up a
preference ranking. Preference-based accounts of well-being reduce
the well-being ranking of outcomes, for some person, to the
realization of that person’s preferences—not to the feelings of
satisfaction experienced by that person.
The SWB literature regularly blurs the line between preferencerealization (on the one hand) and feelings of satisfaction or beliefs
regarding preference-realization (on the other), and the related point
that individuals can have intrinsic preferences for items other than
their own mental states. For example, Ed Diener, Richard Lucas,
Ulrich Schimmack, and John Helliwell analyze well-being in terms of
individuals’ beliefs and self-evaluations: “A life is going well only if
the individual who lives this life endorses it as good and evaluates it
54
positively.” They then explain:
Our definition of well-being . . . is clearly a subjective one. People
have well-being only when they believe that their life is going well,
regardless of whether that life has pleasure, material comforts, a
sense of meaning, or any other objective feature that has been
specified as essential for well-being. . . .
We should note in this context that our subjective definition of
well-being is essentially identical to economists’ concept of
utility. . . . [E]conomists define utility as the satisfaction that a
55
person experiences from the consumption of goods.

Actually, the proposed account of well-being is not “essentially
identical to economists’ concept of utility.” Economists, traditionally,
do not define “utility” as “the satisfaction that a person experiences
from the consumption of goods,” but rather as a numerical function
representing the extent to which Ri is realized (whatever its
53. On what it means to “satisfy” preferences, see generally HAUSMAN, supra note 26.
54. DIENER ET AL., supra note 10, at 11 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 11 (citation omitted).
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arguments, be they physical bundles of commodities, health, leisure,
or happiness). We increase an individual’s utility, in the economic
sense, by acting to produce those features of the world that she
prefers; utility goes up when this happens. What she experiences or
believes as a consequence is a separate question.
One of the great virtues of Kahneman’s work on SWB has been
his consistent attempts to keep in focus the difference between utility
(in the traditional economist’s sense) and good experiences.
Kahneman highlights this difference by using the terms “decision
utility” and “experienced utility.” For example, Paul Dolan and
Kahneman write:
The word ‘utility’ has two distinct meanings: it can refer either to the
hedonic experience of an outcome or to the preference or desire for
that outcome. These have been labelled experienced utility and
decision utility, respectively. Jeremy Bentham first defined utility in
hedonic terms, as a measure of pleasure and pain, and economists
followed that usage until the twentieth century. . . .
Economists abandoned experienced utility early in the twentieth
century, in favour of a new interpretation, in which utility represents
‘wantability.’ A person’s decision utilities are revealed by her
choices. . . . Neoclassical welfare economics rests on a concept of
decision utility that is cleansed of any reference to hedonic
56
experience . . . .

However, the term “decision utility” as a measure of preference
realization is somewhat problematic. It suggests, misleadingly, that a
ranking of choices (decisions) is primary, when in fact the standard
formal apparatus—expected-utility theory—makes someone’s
ranking of choices derivative from her ranking of outcomes, plus
probabilities. Moreover, although prior generations of economists
(impressed by the observability of preferences for choices) did favor
the use of choice data to infer preferences for outcomes, many
economists now happily do so via surveys (“stated preference”
57
formats).
Instead, modifying half of Kahneman’s terminology, I will
distinguish between preference utility and experience utility. An
individual’s preference utility is a number assigned to outcomes (or
56. Paul Dolan & Daniel Kahneman, Interpretations of Utility and Their Implications for
the Valuation of Health, 118 ECON. J. 215, 215 (2008) (citations omitted).
57. For a discussion of both the stated-preference methodology and the traditional view
favoring behavioral evidence of preferences, see sources cited infra notes 119, 121.
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other items, for example, choices) representing her ranking of
outcomes (or her ranking of those other items). An individual’s
58
experience utility is a number assigned to outcomes (or other items )
measuring the quality of her experience.
B. Do Individuals Prefer More Than Good Experiences?
If preferences with nonmental fundamental arguments were
empirically rare, policy analysis might be simplified by ignoring them.
Policy models and tools might be structured on the premise that
individuals intrinsically care only about their own experiences—with
the justification that this simplifies the methodologies without too
much loss in accuracy. But there is not clear evidence that individuals
generally lack an intrinsic preference for health, liberty, goal
fulfillment, consumption, relationships, knowledge, or other items
that are (at least partly) nonexperiential. Absent such clear evidence,
the preferentialist about well-being should endorse policy tools that
leave open the possibility of preferences with nonmental fundamental
arguments.
The relative importance of experiential and nonexperiential
arguments in individuals’ preference rankings is, in fact, a topic that
scholars have not systematically investigated. To be sure, the SWB
literature has documented, in great detail, the various ways in which
individuals fail to maximize their own happiness. However, such
findings—without more—do not do much to illuminate the structure
of individual preferences. For example, the fact that someone chooses
to procreate even though the average parent is no happier than the
average childless adult is consistent both with the hypothesis that she
has an intrinsic preference for parenting, and with the hypothesis that
she has an intrinsic preference only for happiness plus mistaken
59
beliefs about the hedonic benefits of parenting. Similarly, someone’s
decision to pursue a higher education even though education appears
to have little hedonic benefit might be motivated by an intrinsic
preference for knowledge, or by a misunderstanding about how
60
happy the better educated are.
In order to determine whether an individual intrinsically prefers
some nonexperiential feature of outcomes, we need to specify the
experiential consequences of different alternatives presented to the
58. For example, Kahneman assigns experience utility to moments. See infra Part III.B.
59. See supra note 45 (describing evidence of SWB impact of parenting).
60. See supra note 44 (describing evidence of SWB impact of education).
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individual (or estimate her beliefs concerning those upshots), and
then see what her ranking of the alternatives is. Only a few studies
have attempted to do this, and their findings are mixed.
Laura King and Christie Napa tested for the relative strength of
individual preferences for happiness and a sense of meaning (types of
experiences), as opposed to income, by showing respondents an
ostensible “career survey,” which respondents believed to be a
61
questionnaire filled out by a subject describing her job. In these
questionnaires, the subject characterized her income as relatively high
(>$100,000) or low ($21,000 to $30,000), and also answered questions
about how happy she was in her job and how meaningful she found
the job. Respondents were then asked to rate the desirability of the
subject’s life—specifically, via three questions, one of which asked,
“How much would you like to have this person’s life?” on a scale
from 1 to 5, with the other two asking about the quality of the
subject’s life and the extent to which she was living “the good life.”
King and Napa found that the subject’s happiness and sense of
meaning were much more significant than her income in driving
62
respondents’ desirability ratings. However, the relative importance
of happiness and sense of meaning, as opposed to nonincome items,
was not examined.
In preliminary, unpublished work, Paul Dolan and I presented
respondents with different hypothetical lives—characterized in terms
of the subject’s income, life expectancy, health, and happiness
(specifically, what proportion of the time the subject was in a good
mood)—and asked respondents to identify their most preferred life,
their second choice, and so forth. We found the subject’s health, and
then happiness, to be the most significant features in explaining
63
respondents’ preferences over the hypothetical lives.
Daniel Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles Kimball, and Alex ReesJones studied preferences for SWB by administering a survey that
64
posed a series of binary, hypothetical choices. (For example, one
choice was between a job paying $80,000/year with reasonable hours,
permitting seven-and-a-half hours sleep each night, and a job paying
61. Laura A. King & Christie K. Napa, What Makes a Life Good?, 75 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 156, 158 (1998).
62. Id. at 158–61.
63. Matthew Adler & Paul Dolan, Introducing a “Different Lives” Approach to the
Valuation of Health and Well-Being 12 (Kenan Inst. for Ethics at Duke Univ., Working Paper
No. 5, 2012).
64. Benjamin et al., supra note 51, at 2087.
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$140,000 year allowing only six hours of nightly rest.) Their clever
research strategy was to ask respondents, first, which choice would
maximize SWB (either happiness or life satisfaction, depending on
the sample, via a question such as, “Between these two options,
taking all things together, which do you think would give you a
happier life as a whole?”) and, second, which option they would
66
choose. Divergent answers to the two questions by a given
respondent show that she cares about something other than her
predicted happiness/life satisfaction. Finally, a subsample of
respondents were asked to identify the better option in light of
various factors other than the respondent’s happiness/life
satisfaction—specifically, her family’s happiness, her health, romantic
life, social life, control over her life, spirituality, social status, fun, her
67
life’s “nonboringness,” physical comfort, and sense of purpose.
The authors found that, on average “SWB and choice coincide 83
68
percent of the time in our data,” but that the strength of this
relationship varied substantially depending on choice situation,
subject population and questionnaire design. Moreover, in a
regression analysis, respondent-predicted SWB was by far the
strongest predictor of choice, but “sense of purpose, control over life,
69
family happiness, and social status” also had some role.
An earlier, much smaller study comparing hypothetical choice
with predictions of happiness—by Amos Tversky and Dale Griffin—
found a larger deviation between the two than the Benjamin et al.
70
study.
In a second study, Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Rees-Jones
71
were able to compare actual choice with anticipated SWB. They
asked medical students who had just submitted their rankings for the
National Resident Matching Program to assign a level of anticipated
SWB to each of their top four chosen residencies (both SWB during
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2087–88.
67. Id. at 2097.
68. Id. at 2085.
69. Id.
70. Amos Tversky & Dale Griffin, Endowments and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being,
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 709, 722–23 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000).
71. Daniel J. Benjamin, Ori Heffetz, Miles S. Kimball & Alex Rees-Jones, Can Marginal
Rates of Substitution Be Inferred from Happiness Data? Evidence from Residency Choices 9–15,
31 (Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series, No. 8-2013, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2221538.
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the residency itself, and over the remainder of their lives). The
students were also asked to characterize each of the top four choices
in terms of a number of attributes, such as the residency’s prestige,
locational desirability, how stressful it would be, its career value, and
its desirability to the student’s significant other (if any). The authors
used statistical techniques to measure the tradeoffs between the
attributes, first in terms of choice (how the students ranked
programs) and second in terms of anticipated SWB, and found
significant differences. If the students were ranking residencies to
maximize anticipated SWB, no such differences should have been
observed.
In a recent large-scale survey, Paul Dolan and Robert Metcalfe
asked individuals which of eight specific life domains “matters most in
72
your life.” Notably, the domains included “Mental wellbeing.” A
large plurality (42 percent) of respondents identified “Personal
relationships” as the most important domain, and “Physical health”
was also thus identified by a substantially larger percentage (18
73
percent) than singled out “Mental wellbeing” (7 percent).
Other bodies of research do not directly address the strength of
individuals’ preferences for nonexperiential items but still have some
probative weight on this issue. First, by contrast with the Dolan and
Metcalfe survey, some surveys pose an open-ended question about the
most significant life domains—asking the respondent to list whichever
aspects of his life he cares most about or sees as most important.
Often, respondents include domains characterized in nonexperiential
terms. For example, a large-scale survey asked British citizens to list
the “most important areas of their life” and to place them in priority
74
order. The largest fraction of respondents described relationships
with friends or family as the single most important area of their lives,
followed by “finances/standard-of-living/housing,” and then the
75
respondent’s health.

72. DOLAN & METCALFE, supra note 18, at 11, 20; see also Ed Diener & Christie Scollon,
Subjective Well-Being Is Desirable, but Not the Summum Bonum 8–9, 20 (July 2, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (asking college students in
various countries to rate happiness compared to other values such as wealth, love, health, and so
forth).
73. DOLAN & METCALFE, supra note 18, at 5, 20 tbl.10.
74. Ann Bowling & Joy Windsor, Towards the Good Life: A Population Survey of
Dimensions of Quality of Life, 2 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 55, 61 (2001).
75. Id. at 59, 61, 64.
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It is possible that someone who uses nonexperiential language to
describe his most important domain actually cares only about his
experiences. For example, if I say that friendship is utmost, I might
mean to say that (1) feeling satisfied by my friendships is utmost. Or,
I might be saying that (2) feeling happy is utmost, and I believe that
having friends is the surest route to my own happiness. But it seems
more plausible that someone who cared mainly about the quality of
his own experiences would use explicitly experiential descriptors
(“being happy,” “feeling good about my life”) to identify the highestpriority part of his life.
A second body of research with some probative weight regarding
nonexperiential preference arguments focuses on patients’ valuations
76
of health states. This research is one portion of the larger qualityadjusted life year (QALY) literature, which asks patients, health care
providers, or members of the general population to value health
states on a 0 to 1 scale (with 0 meaning a health state no better than
death, and 1 meaning perfect health), using time-tradeoff, standard77
gamble, or direct-rating questions.
76. See generally Xavier Badia, Michael Herdman & Paul Kind, The Influence of Ill-Health
Experience on the Valuation of Health, 13 PHARMACOECONOMICS 687 (1998); Laura J.
Damschroder, Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Peter A. Ubel, Considering Adaptation in Preference
Elicitations, 27 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 394 (2008) [hereinafter Damschroder et al., Considering
Adaptation]; Laura J. Damschroder, Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Peter A. Ubel, The Impact of
Considering Adaptation in Health State Valuation, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 267 (2005); Jason Riis et
al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using Ecological Momentary
Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3 (2005); Dylan Smith et al., Mispredicting
and Misremembering: Patients with Renal Failure Overestimate Improvements in Quality of Life
After a Kidney Transplant, 27 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 653 (2008); Dylan M. Smith, Stephanie L.
Brown & Peter A. Ubel, Mispredictions and Misrecollections: Challenges for Subjective Outcome
Measurement, 30 DISABILITY & REHABILITATION 418 (2008); Dylan M. Smith, Ryan L.
Sherriff, Laura Damschroder, George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Misremembering
Colostomies? Former Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings Than Do Current Patients, 25 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 688 (2006) [hereinafter Smith et al., Misremembering Colostomies]; Peter A. Ubel,
George Loewenstein & Christopher Jepson, Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions
Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: APPLIED 111 (2005); Peter A. Ubel et al., Do Nonpatients
Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with Chronic Health Conditions Because of a
Focusing Illusion?, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 190 (2001); Peter A. Ubel, George
Loewenstein, Norbert Schwarz & Dylan Smith, Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability
Paradox and Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57 (2005) [hereinafter Ubel
et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable]; Peter A. Ubel, George Loewenstein & Christopher
Jepson, Whose Quality of Life? A Commentary Exploring Discrepancies Between Health State
Evaluations of Patients and the General Public, 12 QUALITY LIFE RES. 599 (2003) [hereinafter
Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life?].
77. See Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 1 & n.1, 8–9 nn. 25–26 (2006) (collecting sources).
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The literature on the hedonic effects of disease documents
substantial, sometimes complete hedonic adaptation. “[N]umerous
studies have found that people with chronic health conditions as
severe as kidney failure or paraplegia report moods that are relatively
78
close to those reported by healthy persons . . . .” Still, healthy
individuals frequently assign low QALY values to disease states. This
itself does not show that healthy individuals have an intrinsic
preference not to be diseased. Perhaps, instead, they care mainly
about affects and feelings but underestimate the extent of hedonic
adaptation to disease.
More interesting, here, is the fact that patients themselves tend to
give QALY values lower than 1 to their diseases. Several general
findings emerge from research about patient valuations. First, these
79
valuations are higher than healthy individuals’. Second, these
valuations are still substantially below the top of the scale: “both
patients and healthy people agree that living with a chronic health
80
condition is worse than living in perfect health . . . .”
Because patients (unlike members of the general population) are
aware of the moods and feelings associated with their disease, a
QALY rating below 1 does suggest an intrinsic preference for
81
health. For example, in one striking study, Dylan Smith and his coauthors asked both individuals with colostomies and former
colostomy patients whose bowel function had subsequently been
restored to (1) quantify their current moods and life satisfaction using
standard SWB questions, and (2) assign a QALY value to having a
colostomy, using a time-tradeoff question (which asks about
82
willingness to reduce life span in return for a health improvement).
Current patients reported, on average, a degree of life satisfaction
only slightly lower than that of former patients and better moods. In
other words, hedonic adaptation to having a colostomy seems to be
virtually complete. However, current patients also, on average,
expressed a willingness to reduce their life span by 16 percent in
83
exchange for a return to perfect health. This seems to be substantial
78. Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 19, at 1799.
79. This finding has been termed the “disability paradox.” Ubel et al., Misimagining the
Unimaginable, supra note 76, at S57.
80. Damschroder et al., Considering Adaptation, supra note 76, at 394.
81. See Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 19, at 1799–1800, 1803.
82. Smith et al., Misremembering Colostomies, supra note 76, at 689–90.
83. See id. at 192 tbl.2. The life-satisfaction and mood differences between current and
former patients were not statistically significant. Id.
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(if not conclusive) evidence that colostomy patients care about
healthy bowel function as such, not just about the moods and feelings
84
associated with having or lacking a healthy bowel.
To sum up, the extent to which individuals intrinsically care
about nonexperiential aspects of their lives warrants much more
intensive study. The existing body of empirical work bearing on this
issue is quite small and hardly suffices to demonstrate that individuals
generally lack such preferences. Policy tools for implementing a
preference-based account of well-being should therefore be
structured to allow for the possibility that some individuals, at least,
have preferences with nonexperiential fundamental arguments.
C. The Policy Relevance of Subjective Well-Being Surveys: Two
Defenses
We can now distinguish two possible defenses of the policy
relevance of SWB surveys. By SWB survey, again, I mean a survey
that asks for a numerical rating of the respondent’s overall or
momentary happiness, life satisfaction, or some other aspect of her
mental life.
One defense, the PR (preference-realization) defense, adopts a
preference view of well-being—analyzing an individual’s well-being in
terms of the realization of her preferences, and allowing that the
fundamental arguments for those preferences can include items other
than her mental states (such as her health, liberty, relationships,
accomplishments, and so forth). The content of individual i’s ranking
of possible outcomes, Ri, is for her to determine; her self-rated SWB,
in turn, is taken as a defeasible indicator of whether the actual
outcome is located high or low in this ranking.
Why would this be the case? Although preference realization
and the preference-holder’s feelings of satisfaction are distinct, there
is some plausibility in thinking that an individual’s answer to an SWB
survey is good if not perfect evidence of her preference realization.
After all (so the account goes) the typical arguments for preferences,
if not necessarily mental states, are still features of the world to which
individuals have good epistemic access. Some proportion of the
population will be hypochondriacs, some proportion will be in denial
about their diseases, but most people will know pretty well how
84. It is not conclusive because colostomy patients may be mispredicting the hedonic
benefit of a return to perfect health.
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healthy they are. Some poor souls will be deceived by spouses,
friends, or colleagues, but many others will have an accurate sense of
the quality of their social lives.
A quite different defense, the EQ (experience-quality) defense,
sees an appropriately designed SWB survey as evidence of the quality
of an individual’s mental states. For example, an individual who says
her happiness is 7 on a 1 to 7 scale gives us strong evidence that her
current mood and emotions are positive and that she is not in pain.
These facts about her mental life (specifically, her affective state)
contribute favorably to her well-being. Or, an individual who says she
is “not satisfied” indicates that she is currently feeling unsatisfied—
and, plausibly, feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction also are
mental facts relevant to well-being. The EQ defense might be allied
to an experientialist account of well-being, and thus take the strong
form. Less ambitiously, the EQ defense might reject or bracket the
experientialism requirement, and instead claim only that good mental
states are one dimension of well-being, and that SWB surveys in turn
provide evidence regarding this dimension.
More simply, this duality of roles for SWB surveys can be
expressed using Kahneman’s bifurcation between decision utility
85
(better, preference utility) and experience utility. An individual’s
answer to an SWB survey might be evidence of her preference utility.
Alternatively, it might be evidence of her experience utility.
Figure 1. Possible Defenses of the Policy Relevance of Subjective WellBeing Surveys
The PR defense:
SWB surveys as
evidence of
preference utility
The EQ defense:
SWB surveys as
evidence of
experience utility

85. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

“Strong”: wellbeing is no more
than good
mental states
“Weak”: good
mental states are
one component
of well-being
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In the remainder of this Article, I carefully work through this
flowchart.
Some SWB scholars will be impatient with close consideration of
the PR account. “This is just a straw man,” they might say. “The point
of SWB surveys is obviously to measure experience utility, not
preference utility.”
However, a careful reading of SWB scholarship suggests that
some prominent SWB researchers do adopt the PR defense. For
example, Andrew Clark, Michael Frijters, and Paul Shields, in a wideranging article on the Easterlin paradox, explain that they see this as
a paradox concerning decision utility. The flat time trend of SWB
scores suggests (as they see it) that increasing per-capita GDP makes
86
little difference to decision utility over time within a given country.
They propose to “explain” the paradox by constructing a decision
utility function that includes relative as well as absolute income as
arguments and that incorporates adaptation effects. As they explain:
The explanation of the Easterlin paradox detailed in this paper rests
on the ways in which income translates into utility. It is important to
be clear about the logical step that we are taking here. While the
paradox is couched in terms of income and happiness, we are going
to appeal to a specific type of utility function to account for it. In
other words, we imagine that happiness scores provide information
about utility. . . . Section 4 will then explicitly set out the evidence
87
linking happiness and utility.

And what they then write at the beginning of Section 4 is: “In this
section we ask what basis there is for believing that happiness is a
reasonable measure of the economic notion of (decision) utility, i.e.,
88
the thing whose maximization leads to choice behavior.”

86. Andrew E. Clark, Paul Frijters & Michael A. Shields, Relative Income, Happiness, and
Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE
95, 99–106, 115 (2008). The “paradox,” first observed by Richard Easterlin, is the substantial
growth of income in many countries without a corresponding rise in happiness levels. Id. at 95.
But see Daniel W. Sacks, Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Subjective Wellbeing, Income,
Economic Development and Growth, in . . . AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: WELL-BEING
AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 59, 59 (Philip Booth ed., 2012) (challenging the existence of
the paradox).
87. Clark et al., supra note 86, at 99 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). At the conclusion of Section 4 of the article, Clark et al.
note reason for caution about “the link between happiness and utility” and here, again, make
explicit that by “utility” they mean “decision utility.” Id. at 121; see also Erik Angner, Subjective
Well-Being: When, and Why, It Matters 18 (Aug. 31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2157140 (suggesting that a happiness
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Others defend SWB surveys as evidence of “utility” without
89
disambiguating that term. Indeed, the failure of the literature to
draw a sharp distinction between SWB surveys as evidence of
preference versus experience utility—notwithstanding Kahneman’s
terminological efforts—is one aspect of the conceptual fuzziness of
this literature. The statement that SWB surveys are policy-relevant
because they indicate “utility” invites the careless reader to commit a
fallacy of equivocation—hybridizing the strong evidentiary role of
SWB surveys qua experience utility, and the welfare relevance of
preference realization. The equivocation runs as follows: “SWB
surveys provide powerful evidence of (experience) utility. But of
course (preference) utility is policy-relevant, on a preference account
of well-being. Thus SWB surveys are policy-relevant.”
It is therefore important to separate out the PR and EQ
accounts—more specifically, to show why the PR account is
problematic (Part II of this Article), before turning to the more
plausible view that SWB surveys are useful evidence to governments
in providing information about the quality of individuals’ mental
states.
II. DO SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING SURVEYS FURNISH GOOD
EVIDENCE OF PREFERENCE UTILITY?
This Part critically evaluates the possible use of SWB scores as
evidence of preference utility. Section A outlines some significant
obstacles to such inference: scale recalibration, preference
heterogeneity, evaluation error, and miscommunication. Section B
discusses the extent to which these potential obstacles can be
circumvented via econometric techniques.
To be sure, SWB surveys might be imperfect evidence of
preference utility but still better evidence than other sources. Section
C argues to the contrary. Stated-preference surveys dominate SWB
surveys as evidence of preference utility. If well-being reduces to
measure can provide useful information about preference-realization insofar as individuals want
happiness or happiness is sufficiently correlated with preference-realization); Peter Railton,
Subjective Well-Being as Information and Guidance 33 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available
at
http://profron.net/happiness/files/readings/Railton_SubjectiveWellBeing.pdf
(suggesting that the affective and life-satisfaction components of an individual’s SWB provide
information about her success in attaining, respectively, short-term and long-term goals).
89. See, e.g., Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 24, at 1361; Rafael Di Tella & Robert
MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2006, at 25,
28.
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preference realization, and if surveys (in addition to behavioral data)
provide useful information about what individuals prefer, SWB
surveys have no advantages over stated-preference surveys and many
disadvantages.
In much of this Part, I focus on the proposal to use SWB surveys
to calculate monetary equivalents for nonmarket goods. On the PR
account of SWB surveys, this proposal says that SWB surveys are
useful information regarding the amount that individuals are willing
to pay/accept for those goods. It will be helpful, in assessing the value
of SWB surveys, to do so with reference to a specific policy tool that
such surveys might be seen as informing. And the monetaryequivalent proposal is one of the key recommendations to emerge
from the SWB literature. Moreover (as will be explained below) this
proposal is less informationally demanding than proposals that
require the summation or averaging of SWB scores (for example, the
calculation of gross national happiness). The use of SWB surveys to
calculate willingness-to-pay/accept (WTP/WTA) amounts requires
only that the surveys evidence individuals’ ordinal preference utility.
Thus, if they perform poorly in this ordinal role—as I will contend—
then a fortiori they are problematic as evidence of individuals’
90
cardinal preference utilities.
This Part generally focuses on life-satisfaction rather than
happiness questions. Asking an individual to quantify how satisfied
she is with her life would seem to be a relatively more promising
vehicle for ascertaining her degree of preference utility than asking
her how happy she is. If life-satisfaction questions are, in fact, poor
evidence of preference utility—as I will contend—then a fortiori
happiness questions are as well.
Finally, so as to simplify the exposition, I will assume that each
individual’s preference ranking of outcomes is solely a function of her
own attributes in the outcomes. Individual i prefers outcome x to
outcome x* just in case she prefers A to A*, where A are her
91
attributes in x and A* in x*. “Attributes” is understood in a broad

90. See infra Part II.A.3.
91. To say that a given individual i prefers bundle A to bundle A* is a shorthand for saying:
i prefers it to be the case that she has attributes A, as opposed to it being the case that she has
attributes A*. Thus, when we compare how various individuals rank a given set of attribute
bundles, we are not comparing how those individuals rank the very same states of affairs.
Rather, we are comparing how one individual ranks states of affairs specified as those in which
she has various possible attributes, to how a second individual ranks states of affairs specified as
those in which he has various possible attributes.
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sense to include nonmental and relational attributes. An individual’s
health is an attribute, as is the quality of public goods she enjoys, or
the happiness of her children. This ranking is representable by a
preference-utility function ui(.), such that i prefers attribute bundle A
to A* if and only if ui(A) > ui(A*).
A. Inferring Preference Utility from Life-Satisfaction Questions:
Some Obstacles
1. Scale Recalibration and Preference Heterogeneity. Preference
heterogeneity and scale recalibration (heterogeneity in the utility
scales used to express preferences) are conceptually distinct obstacles
to inferring preferences from life-satisfaction surveys, but for
expository purposes are discussed in tandem here.
Imagine that Phyllis has a current income of y and a level z of
some nonincome attribute (an environmental good, health, etc.).
Asked how satisfied she is with her life, she says “7.” Gina has a
smaller current income of y*, which is less than y by amount ∆y. Her
level of the other attribute is z*, which exceeds z by amount ∆z.
When asked how satisfied she is with her life, Gina also says “7.”
Assume, now, that the following are true. (1) Phyllis and Gina
have identical preferences. Each has the very same ranking of
attribute packages (here, combinations of income and the nonincome
attribute). For every A and A*, either both individuals prefer A to A*,
or both prefer A* to A, or both are indifferent. (2) Each uses the
same numerical scale to express her ranking of attribute packages. In
other words, Phyllis articulates her ranking via a preference-utility
function uPhyllis(.), such that uPhyllis(A) > uPhyllis(A*) whenever Phyllis
prefers A to A*. And—it turns out—the preference-utility function
uGina(.) by means of which Gina expresses her ranking of the bundles is
exactly the same function as uPhyllis(.). For every bundle A, uPhyllis(A) =
uGina(A).
Finally, (3) Gina and Phyllis each respond to a life-satisfaction
question by articulating her preference utility for her current attribute
package. When Gina possesses attribute bundle A and is asked “How
satisfied are you with your life?,” the answer she gives is just uGina(A).
Similarly, if Phyllis possesses bundle B and is asked the same
question, the answer she gives is uPhyllis(B).
If all of the premises just mentioned hold true, we can make
inferences about Phyllis and Gina’s WTP/WTA amounts for the
nonincome attribute. For example, in the case described three
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paragraphs above, we can infer that Phyllis, Gina, and anyone else
with the same preferences as them is willing to pay ∆y dollars for an
increase in the z attribute by amount ∆z. If the case were varied, so
that Gina’s answer to the life-satisfaction question is a number
greater than 7, we could infer that Phyllis, Gina, and anyone with the
same preferences is willing to pay more than ∆y for an increase in the
z attribute by amount ∆z. Finally, an answer less than 7 would
indicate that Phyllis, Gina, and anyone with the same preferences is
willing to pay less than ∆y for that increase in the z attribute.
But consider, now, relaxing the premise of identical scales. As
economists are very well-aware, a utility function representing an
ordering of attribute bundles (or any other items) is hardly unique;
rather, it is unique only up to an ordinal (“increasing”)
92
transformation. Even though Phyllis and Gina have the same
ranking of possible bundles, it need not be the case that uPhyllis(.)—the
mathematical function which Phyllis uses to express that ranking—is
the same as uGina(.). For example, if there are six bundles, and each of
the women prefers the first to the second, the second to the third, and
so forth, then Phyllis might express this preference via the numbers 9,
8, 7, 6, 5, 4, whereas Gina might use the numbers 6, 5.5, 4, 3.5, 3, 2.5.
Even holding fixed the assumption of identical preferences, scale
heterogeneity interferes with our ability to make inferences regarding
Phyllis’s and Gina’s WTP/WTA amounts. Back to the case in which
Phyllis with attributes (y, z) says that her life satisfaction is 7, and
Gina with attributes (y − ∆y, z + ∆z) also says that her life satisfaction
is 7. What can we infer about how much Phyllis and Gina are willing
to pay for an increase in the z attribute by ∆z? Not much. It might be
the case that they are willing to pay exactly ∆y for ∆z. But it might
also be that they are willing to pay less than ∆y. (Imagine that both
Phyllis and Gina prefer the package (y, z) to the package (y − ∆y, z +
∆z), but Phyllis represents this preference by assigning the number 7
to the first package and 4 to the second, whereas Gina represents this
preference by assigning the number 9 to the first package and 7 to the
second.) Finally, it might be the case that they are willing to pay more
than ∆y.
Preference heterogeneity further complicates the picture. If we
allow for the possibility that Phyllis and Gina may have different
92. Let u(.) be one function of attribute bundles, u*(.) a second. To say that u*(.) is an
increasing transformation of u(.) means that whenever u(A) = u(B), u*(A) = u*(B) and
whenever u(A) > u(B), u*(A) > u*(B).
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rankings of the attribute bundles, the fact that Phyllis has told us her
preference utility for one bundle (y, z), and Gina has told us her
preference utility for one bundle (y − ∆y, z + ∆z), permits no
inferences about whether Phyllis is willing to pay more, less, or
exactly ∆y for ∆z. Nor does it permit inferences about whether Gina
is willing to pay more, less, or exactly ∆y for ∆z. To make inferences
about Phyllis’s WTP amount—absent an assumption of preference
homogeneity—we would need to hear Phyllis express her preference
utility for both bundles (and similarly for Gina).
To see this in a yet simpler way: imagine that Phyllis is asked
about her utility for chocolate ice cream and says “7,” whereas Gina
is asked about her utility for vanilla ice cream and also says “7.”
Unless we have some reason to believe that the two have the same
tastes in ice cream (and also are using the same utility scale), can we
conclude anything about whether Phyllis prefers chocolate, prefers
vanilla, or is indifferent? Can we conclude anything about whether
Gina prefers chocolate, prefers vanilla, or is indifferent? Of course
not.
Nor do problems of scale and preference heterogeneity
disappear when we have multiple answers to life-satisfaction
questions from the same person, as with longitudinal (panel) data.
Vary the case under discussion so that Howard at Time 1, when he
has income y and nonincome attribute z, says that his life satisfaction
is 7. At Time 2, when Howard’s income has decreased to y − ∆y and
his level of the nonincome attribute has increased to z + ∆z, he also
says that his life satisfaction is 7. Can we infer that Howard’s WTP for
∆z is ∆y? Not necessarily. One possibility is that Howard has the same
ranking of attribute bundles at each time but uses a different
preference-utility function to express that ranking at Time 2 than at
Time 1.
It is also possible that the ranking of bundles has itself shifted.
There are various potential systematic sources of intrapersonal
preference heterogeneity. For example, individuals’ preferences may
tend to change as they age. A different kind of intrapersonal
preference heterogeneity arises from adaptive/counteradaptive
preferences. Imagine that an individual’s ranking of attribute bundles
at a particular point in time varies, in a systematic way, with his past
levels of the attributes. One possibility—adaptive preferences—
would be that higher levels of an attribute in the recent past tend to
induce the individual to have a weaker preference for the attribute.
For example, if the individual has a current income of $100,000 and
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has had that income for several years, he may require more
immediate income compensation for a given change in his health
state, than if he has a current income of $100,000 but in prior years
93
had an income of $50,000. Reciprocally, if higher levels of an
attribute in the recent past induce a stronger preference for the
attribute, the individual’s preferences would be counteradaptive.
In short, inter- and intrapersonal preference heterogeneity and
scale heterogeneity are—in principle—obstacles to inferring
preferences from SWB surveys. What is the evidence that these
phenomena actually occur?
The empirical literature on preferences provides ample evidence
of interpersonal preference heterogeneity. Numerous studies using
standard preference data, other than SWB studies themselves (that is,
behavioral data or stated-preference data), in various contexts, have
confirmed the common-sense point that different individuals often
have different rankings of commodity bundles, income-leisure
94
bundles, different degrees of risk aversion, and so forth.
Moreover, various literatures document interpersonal “scale
recalibration”: interpersonal heterogeneity in the numerical scales
that individuals use to report various phenomena. For instance, a
substantial literature documents interpersonal heterogeneity in health
95
rating scales. Here are a few illustrative examples. In one study,
Peter Ubel and his co-authors asked respondents to rate their own
health on a scale from 0 to 100. One group was told that 100
93. For a formal model of adaptive preferences, see Clark et al., supra note 86, at 104–06.
94. See ADLER, supra note 27, at 279 n.57 (collecting sources).
95. E.g., Wim Groot, Adaptation and Scale of Reference Bias in Self-Assessments of Quality
of Life, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 403 (2000); Heather P. Lacey et al., Are They Really That Happy?
Exploring Scale Recalibration in Estimates of Well-Being, 27 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 669 (2008);
Maarten Lindeboom & Eddy van Doorslaer, Cut-Point Shift and Index Shift in Self-Reported
Health, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 1083 (2004); Erik Meijer, Arie Kapteyn & Tatiana Andreyeva,
Internationally Comparable Health Indices, 20 HEALTH ECON. 600 (2011); Debby Postulart &
Eddy M.M. Adang, Response Shift and Adaptation in Chronically Ill Patients, 20 MED.
DECISION MAKING 186 (2000); Joshua A. Salomon, Ajay Tandon & Christopher J.L. Murray,
Comparability of Self Rated Health: Cross Sectional Multi-Country Survey Using Anchoring
Vignettes, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 258 (2004), doi:10.1136/bmj.37963.691632.44; Amir Shmueli,
Reporting Heterogeneity in the Measurement of Health and Health-Related Quality of Life, 20
PHARMACOECONOMICS 405 (2002); Amir Shmueli, Socio-Economic and Demographic
Variation in Health and in Its Measures: The Issue of Reporting Heterogeneity, 57 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 125 (2003); Mirjam A.G. Sprangers & Carolyn E. Schwartz, Integrating Response Shift
into Health-Related Quality of Life Research: A Theoretical Model, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1507
(1999); Peter A. Ubel, Aleksandra Jankovic, Dylan Smith, Kenneth M. Langa & Angela
Fagerlin, What Is Perfect Health to an 85-Year-Old?: Evidence for Scale Recalibration in
Subjective Health Ratings, 43 MED. CARE 1054 (2005).
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represented “perfect health”; a second, that it represented “perfect
health for someone your age”; a third, that it represented “perfect
96
health for a 20-year-old.” The third scale was anchored on a specific
age, whereas the second was anchored on the respondent’s age.
Average ratings using the first two scales were very close. By contrast,
average ratings using the third were lower—suggesting that
respondents interpreted “perfect health” as “perfect health for
97
someone your age,” a kind of recalibration.
In another study, Joshua Salomon and his co-authors presented
respondents in different countries with “mobility vignettes”:
descriptions of hypothetical subjects, highlighting their ability to
move around, using language such as the following: “Rina has had a
stiff neck for the last 10 days and it makes her move around slowly as
any sudden movement causes pain.” Or, “Louis is able to move his
arms and legs, but requires assistance in standing up from a chair or
walking around the house. Any bending is painful, and lifting is
98
impossible.” Respondents were asked to describe the subject’s
degree of mobility, using five ordered categories: no, mild, moderate,
severe, or extreme difficulty moving around. Respondents tended to
order the vignettes similarly, but to vary by country and age in their
application of the five categories, suggesting scale heterogeneity. For
example, both Chinese and Sri Lankan respondents might tend to
place Louis in a less mobile category than Rina; but the plurality of
Sri Lankans might rate Louis as having “extreme” difficulty with
respect to mobility, whereas the plurality of Chinese might rate his
99
difficulty as “severe.”
As already mentioned, individuals with a particular disease tend
to assign higher QALY values to that disease than do members of the
100
general population. There are at least three different explanations
for this divergence: (1) patients and members of the general
population have different factual understandings of the impact of the
disease state on the patient’s life (for example, its hedonic impact);
(2) patients and members of the general population have different
preferences regarding disease states; and (3) patients and members of
the general population use different rating scales to express their

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Ubel et al., supra note 95, at 1055 tbl.1.
Id. at 1056.
Salomon et al., supra note 95, at 2.
Id. at 3–4.
See supra notes 76–84 and accompanying text.
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preferences (scale recalibration). The relative importance of these
three explanations is contested, but substantial evidence suggests that
102
scale recalibration is at least one part of the picture.
Heterogeneity in health rating scales may furnish direct evidence
of heterogeneity in preference-utility scales. In some contexts,
individuals are using the health number to express their preferences
over health states. At a minimum, heterogeneity in the scales used to
assign numbers to health states or other phenomena provides
circumstantial evidence of scale recalibration with respect to
preference utility. If individuals vary in how they use numbers to rate
103
104
health, height, political efficacy, or visual acuity, then (absent
evidence to the contrary) we should be worried about variation in
preference-utility scales.
Bernard van Praag’s survey work using “income evaluation”
questions is an important body of research—suggestive either of
heterogeneity with respect to individuals’ preferences regarding
income, or heterogeneity in preference-utility scales. The respondent
was asked to state the range of incomes she considered to fall in each
of six categories: “very bad,” “bad,” “insufficient,” “sufficient,”
105
“good,” and “very good.” The cutoffs for each category were then
correlated with the respondent’s characteristics, including her actual
income. Van Praag found that an increase in respondent’s income
tended to shift each range upward. The more the respondent’s actual
income, the larger a hypothetical income amount had to be before she
would categorize it as “very good,” “good,” “sufficient,” and so forth.
My discussion, thus far, has focused on studies that document
interpersonal preference heterogeneity and/or scale recalibration via
cross-sectional research designs, showing how different people rank

101. To be sure, scale recalibration would only be relevant for QALY values elicited via
ratings, rather than via time-tradeoff or standard-gamble questions.
102. See Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life?, supra note 76, at 604–05.
103. See Andrew J. Oswald, On the Curvature of the Reporting Function from Objective
Reality to Subjective Feelings, 100 ECON. LETTERS 369, 370–71 (2008).
104. See Gary King, Christopher J.L. Murray, Joshua A. Salomon & Ajay Tandon,
Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research,
98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 191 (2004) (discussing the use of “vignettes” to correct for scale
heterogeneity, and illustrating this technique with respect to measures of political efficacy and
visual acuity); see also Mary Steffel & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Happy by What Standard? The
Role of Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Comparisons in Ratings of Happiness, 92 SOC.
INDICATORS RES. 69 (2009) (finding scale heterogeneity with respect to happiness scales).
105. See BERNARD M.S. VAN PRAAG & ADA FERRER-I-CARBONELL, HAPPINESS
QUANTIFIED: A SATISFACTION CALCULUS APPROACH 5–6, 34–42 (2004).
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or rate various phenomena. There appears to be less work using
longitudinal data, which could directly evidence intrapersonal
preference heterogeneity or scale recalibration. However, crosssectional studies may be suggestive of intrapersonal phenomena. For
example, a cross-sectional finding that older respondents use a
different scale than younger respondents to rate their health suggests
that a given individual will tend to change her health-rating scale as
she ages. Van Praag’s research on income evaluation questions is
some evidence of adaptive preferences with respect to income.
In sum, more research is needed, but existing empirical work
provides evidence of preference heterogeneity and heterogeneity in
preference-utility scales. These are empirically genuine—not merely
theoretical—obstacles to using SWB surveys to infer preference
utility.
2. Evaluation Error and Miscommunication. Return again to the
case in which Gina, while in possession of a particular attribute
bundle, quantifies her life satisfaction as a particular number, and
Phyllis, while in possession of a different bundle, also quantifies her
life satisfaction as that same number. As discussed, if Gina and Phyllis
(1) have the same preferences, represented via (2) the same
preference-utility function, and in addition (3) the answer each gives
to a life-satisfaction survey is exactly equal to her preference utility
for her current attributes, then we can infer their common
WTP/WTA amounts.
“Evaluation error” and “miscommunication” constitute different
types of failure of this last condition. The respondent may misapply
the utility function to her actual bundle of attributes: this is
“evaluation error.” Although her actual attributes are bundle B, Gina
incorrectly perceives her current preference utility to be some value
other than uGina(B). When asked, “How satisfied are you with your
life?,” Gina articulates that value, not uGina(B).
Alternatively, Gina’s perceived preference utility may be correct
(she has attributes B, and indeed perceives her preference utility to
be uGina(B)); but she responds to the question “How satisfied are you
with your life?” by articulating some value other than her perceived
preference utility.
A 1999 book chapter by Norbert Schwarz and Fritz Strack,
reviewing research on the psychology of life-satisfaction questions,
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provides ample evidence of both of these effects. Consider, first,
evaluation error. This can arise in various ways. The respondent’s
preferences might depend upon features of outcomes about which she
107
has imperfect information (as in the example of a preference for a
faithful spouse). Or she might possess the relevant information, but
fail to access it. Schwarz and Strack show how the latter occurs: the
survey instrument, the respondent’s mood, or recent events may focus
her attention on certain information about her current attributes and
divert attention from other data.
When asked, “Taking all things together, how would you say things
are these days?” respondents are ideally assumed to review the
myriad of relevant aspects of their lives and to integrate them into a
mental representation of their life as a whole. In reality, however,
individuals rarely retrieve all information that may be relevant to a
judgment. Instead, they truncate the search process as soon as
enough information has come to mind to form a judgment with
sufficient subjective certainty. Hence, the judgment is based on the
information that is most accessible at that point in time. In general,
the accessibility of information depends on the recency and
108
frequency of its use.

For example, researchers found a strong correlation between
respondent’s dating frequency and life satisfaction only when the
question about dating frequency preceded the life-satisfaction
109
question.
Schwarz and Strack also identify much evidence of mood effects.
[J]udgments of well-being are a function not only of what one thinks
about but also of how one feels at the time of judgment. A wide
range of experimental data confirms this intuition. Finding a dime
on a copy machine, spending time in a pleasant rather than an

106. Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental
Processes and Their Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 61. The terms “evaluation error” and
“miscommunication” are my own; Schwarz and Strack do not use these terms.
107. Cf. Hendrik Jürges, Unemployment, Life Satisfaction and Retrospective Error, 170 J.
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 43, 44 (2007) (discussing the effect of inaccurate memory on survey
responses).
108. Schwarz & Strack, supra note 106, at 63 (citations omitted). A recent review concludes:
“What information people attend to when responding to surveys can strongly affect life
satisfaction judgments.” Ed Diener, Ronald Inglehart & Louis Tay, Theory and Validity of Life
Satisfaction Scales, SOC. INDICATORS RES. 11 (2012), link.springer.com/article/10.1007
%2Fs11205-012-0076-y?LI=true.
109. Schwarz & Strack, supra note 106, at 63.
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unpleasant room, or watching the German soccer team win rather
than lose a championship game all resulted in increased reports of
110
happiness and satisfaction with one’s life as a whole.

Mood effects might involve a kind of evaluation error: mood
makes salient or less visible “mood-congruent” or incongruent
information, respectively. (In plainer English: happy people tend to
see the ways in which their lives are fulfilling their preferences, less
happy people the ways in which they are not.) Mood effects might
instead fall under the heading of miscommunication: the respondent
might understand a life-satisfaction question as asking for a
quantitative measure of her hedonic states—for experience utility—
rather than for her preference utility.
“Miscommunication” is a broad category: anything that leads the
respondent to articulate some number other than her perceived
preference utility for her current attributes is a kind of
miscommunication. For example, cultural norms may encourage
individuals with especially high or low levels of preference utility to
communicate a more mediocre number (or, conversely, push
individuals whose preferences are only modestly realized to claim
111
greater success).
Depending on the order of questions,
conversational norms may induce the respondent to articulate her
“domain satisfaction”—subutility for a subset of attributes—rather
112
than her preference utility for the totality of her attributes.
3. A Note on Cardinality. Much work in economics distinguishes
between ordinal and cardinal utility. For purposes of the present
discussion, the distinction can be framed as follows.
An individual’s ordinal preference-utility function captures her
ranking of attribute bundles. The function uGina(.) is an ordinal utility
function for Gina if, whenever Gina ranks one bundle over a second
bundle, this function assigns the first a higher number. As already
discussed, an ordinal utility function is not unique, but merely unique
up to an increasing transformation. If uGina(.) is an ordinal utility

110. Id. at 74 (citations omitted). Subsequent findings with respect to weather effects have
been mixed. See Diener et al., supra note 108, at 18–19; Sylvia Kämpfer & Michael Mutz, On the
Sunny Side of Life: Sunshine Effects on Life Satisfaction, 110 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 579 (2013).
111. On cultural differences in responses to SWB surveys, see generally Shigehiro Oishi &
Ed Diener, Culture and Well-Being: The Cycle of Action, Evaluation, and Decision, 29
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 939 (2003).
112. See Schwarz & Strack, supra note 106, at 64.
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function for Gina, and u*(.) an increasing transformation of uGina(.),
then u*(.) is also an ordinal utility function for Gina.
An individual’s cardinal preference-utility function not only
captures her ranking of attribute bundles, but also captures some
other feature of her preferences (for example, her ranking of lotteries
over bundles, or her time-tradeoff preferences), such that the utility
113
numbers assigned to bundles can meaningfully be added together.
Using SWB surveys to infer preference utility so as to calculate
WTP/WTA amounts rests upon the various assumptions surveyed in
this Section, namely, that the individuals surveyed have the same
preferences, that their answers to the SWB survey are not corrupted
by evaluation error or miscommunication, and that these individuals
express their preferences using the same preference-utility function.
But using surveys to infer WTP/WTA amounts does not rest upon the
further assumption that this common utility function is cardinal.
To see why not, assume that Phyllis and Gina have the same
preferences (the same ranking of attribute bundles) and express this
ranking using the very same utility function u(.). Phyllis says that her
life satisfaction with bundle (y, z) is 7 because u(y, z) is 7. Gina says
her life satisfaction with bundle (y − ∆y, z + ∆z) is 7 because u(y − ∆y,
z + ∆z) is 7. Then we can correctly infer that Phyllis and Gina are
each willing to pay exactly ∆y for ∆z. And—here’s the critical point—
we could infer the same if Phyllis and Gina were using u*(.) rather
than u(.) to express their common bundle rankings, where u*(.) is any
increasing transformation of u(.).

113. Defining cardinality is a subtle matter, and the definition offered here is rough, but will
suffice for the purpose of this Article. Assume that i has a preference structure represented by
v(.) and by any other function v*(.) just in case v*(.) is an eligible transformation of v(.). For
example, it is well known that, in the case of preferences regarding lotteries, v*(.) needs to be a
positive linear transformation of v(.), that is, v*(.) = av(.) + b, with a positive. Similarly, in the
case of time-tradeoff preferences, v*(.) may need to be a positive ratio transformation of v(.),
that is, v*(.) = av(.), with a positive.
Now consider two possible series of attribute packages: A, B, … versus Aʹ,
Bʹ, …. Utility function v(.) is cardinal if it represents a feature of preferences such that, for every
eligible v*(.), v(A) + v(B) + … ≥ v(Aʹ) + v(Bʹ) + … if and only if v*(A) + v*(B) + … ≥ v*(Aʹ) +
v*(Bʹ) + …. Utility function v(.) and all eligible transformations thereof assign overall sums to
series of packages so as to rank these series the same way. It is therefore “meaningful” to
engage in an operation such as v(A) + v(B) + …, and so v(.) can be termed “cardinal.”
Note that, if v*(.) is a positive ratio transformation, v(.) is cardinal. Moreover, if all
series being compared have the same number of terms, and v*(.) is a positive linear
transformation, v(.) is cardinal. Thus “cardinality,” in the scholarly literature, is often associated
with being a ratio and/or linear transformation.
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However, some plausible uses of SWB data do require cardinal
utility. Consider, in particular, the proposal to calculate gross/average
happiness of various groups, either entire nations or subnational
groups. For purposes of this Part, let us construe this as the proposal
to use SWB surveys so as to estimate the gross/average preference
utility of various groups.
Such a proposal imposes an additional demand upon such
surveys: namely, that respondents have the same preferences, be
uncorrupted by evaluation error or miscommunication, and respond
to the survey by applying a common cardinal utility function to their
current attributes. For example, imagine that there are bundles A, B,
C, and D. Phyllis and Gina each prefer A to B to C to D. They also
have other common preferences (for example, a common ranking of
attribute lotteries, or common time-tradeoff preferences), accurately
represented by a cardinal preference-utility function v(.), which
assigns the bundles the values v(A) = 20, v(B) = 15, v(C) = 10, v(D) =
0.
Imagine that, in 2010, Phyllis has bundle A and Gina has bundle
D. In 2011, Phyllis has bundle B and Gina has bundle C. This means
that the two individuals’ average preference utility has increased over
time, from (20+0)/2 to (15+10)/2.
Imagine, now, that we try to infer the time trend in their average
preference utility by looking at the time trend in their average
numerical responses to SWB surveys. If Gina and Phyllis answer
those surveys by articulating preference-utility values that are ordinal
but not cardinal, our inference may be incorrect. Consider the ordinal
(but not cardinal) utility function u(.), such that u(A) = 7, u(B) = 5,
u(C) = 4, u(D) = 3. If Gina and Phyllis each use this common function
in responding to the question “How satisfied are you with your life?,”
asked in 2010 and 2011, their average SWB score decreases.
In short, anyone proposing to use SWB scores to engage in
interpersonal aggregation or averaging of preference-utility values
must, inter alia, have strong expectations about how respondents
understand the SWB-elicitation question. Respondents must interpret
the question as asking for their preference utility (rather than as
asking for a measure of their current mood, happiness, and so forth),
and indeed as asking for their cardinal preference utility. It seems
wildly speculative that most respondents do in fact interpret a
standard SWB question (“How satisfied are you with your life?”) as
asking for their cardinal preference utility.
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B. Will Econometric Methodology Solve the Problem?
To what extent can econometric techniques mitigate the
114
difficulties identified in the previous Section? This Section briefly
discusses the question. With apologies to some readers, it
presupposes a basic knowledge of econometrics.
Assume—to begin—that the pool of respondents has
homogeneous preferences. However, they are characterized,
potentially, by scale heterogeneity, evaluation error, and
miscommunication.
The standard approach researchers employ is to estimate the
determinants of SWB using ordinary least squares (OLS). The
estimating equation is SWBit = βxit + εit, with xit being a vector of
individual i’s attributes at time t, including income. The ratio of the
coefficient in ˆ for some nonincome good, to the coefficient on
income, immediately yields an estimate of individuals’ WTP for the
good.
The error term in this equation, εit, serves to handle certain kinds
of scale heterogeneity, evaluation error, and miscommunication—
namely, when these are caused by unobserved factors that are
uncorrelated with the observed attributes catalogued in xit. For
example, random variations in day-to-day weather may deflate or
inflate individuals’ moods, randomly changing the mix of information
about attributes that is salient to individuals. Transient psychological
factors may cause an individual to shift upward or downward the
115
preference scale used to express the (common) attribute ranking.
However, the flaw in this strategy—well-recognized by many
116
economists in the SWB literature —is that there may be unobserved

114. For helpful discussions of econometric issues in SWB surveys, see Andrew Clark,
Fabrice Etilé, Fabien Postel-Vinay, Claudia Senik & Karine Van der Straeten, Heterogeneity in
Reported Well-Being, 115 ECON. J. C118 (2005); Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Paul Frijters, How
Important Is Methodology for the Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness?, 114 ECON. J. 641
(2004); Simon Luechinger, Valuing Air Quality Using the Life Satisfaction Approach, 119 ECON.
J. 482 (2009); Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being, 120
Q.J. ECON. 963 (2005); and Nattavudh Powdthavee, How Much Does Money Really Matter?
Estimating the Causal Effects of Income on Happiness, 39 EMPIRICAL ECON. 77 (2010); Dolan et
al., supra note 11.
115. Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 24, at 1361–62.
116. See supra note 114; see also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People
Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 67, 67, 71–72 (2001) (arguing against the use of SWB and similar surveys to predict the
effect of observable individual attributes on individuals’ attitudes because of the correlation of
measurement error with those attributes).
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individual-specific factors that both cause variation in stated SWB
and cause (or otherwise are correlated with) the attributes in xit. For
example, the fact that an individual is unusually happy may both
make her prone to evaluation errors or miscommunications that shift
upward the preference-utility scale and cause her to earn higher
income.
In response to difficulties of this sort, panel data is often used to
estimate an OLS equation with individual fixed effects:
SWBit = βxit + fi + εit. But there are a number of reasons to think that
this strategy is not a full response to the difficulties under discussion.
One point, a technical one, is that OLS with individual fixed
effects assumes a dependent cardinal variable. As discussed earlier, it
is far from clear whether an individual in responding to a lifesatisfaction question is articulating her perceived cardinal (rather
than merely ordinal) utility. Ordinal utility should be estimated via
ordered probit or logit—and incorporating fixed effects in these
models yields a biased estimate of β.
A second and more substantive worry is that the fixed-effect
methodology controls for time-invariant sources of scale
heterogeneity, evaluation error, or miscommunication. But one
theme in the discussion in Section A was that the processes leading to
individual SWB responses may change along with the change in
individual income or other attributes. Intrapersonal scale
recalibration is just this: an individual with a higher income, health,
and so forth, may tend to use a different scale to express his
preferences; this effect will show up in εit rather than in fi, yielding a
biased estimate of β. Similarly, higher levels of certain attributes may
cause improvements in individual moods, in turn inducing a
systematic shift upward in stated life satisfaction. Finally, cultural
norms encouraging respondents to moderate (or inflate) their stated
SWB may come into play just when individuals are at higher levels of
income or other attributes.
Third, OLS with fixed effects controls for the possibility that
time-invariant unobserved factors change the intercept of the line
associating observed factors with stated life satisfaction, but not the
possibility that these skew SWB in more profound ways. For example,
individuals with a particular personality trait might be disposed to
change the slope of the preference-utility function, not just the
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117

intercept. Fourth, OLS with fixed effects has difficulty producing
statistically significant estimates for the coefficients on individual
observed attributes that do not vary much over time.
Fifth, and this is again a deeper worry, it is hard to see how
econometric technique, however sophisticated, can cope with a
certain kind of miscommunication effect. OLS with fixed effects (if
used to estimate preference utility) starts with the assumption that
there is a common preference ranking over attributes, captured by a
common utility function with the form uit = βxit. It then allows for
random or individual-specific changes in expressed preference utility
via fi and εit. But if statements of SWB are caused by some feature of
individuals’ mental states other than their preferences—for example,
by their moods—it is puzzling how any such statement can be used to
estimate the preference-utility function. Consider an analogy.
Individuals may have quantitative beliefs of various sorts (to give one
example, beliefs regarding the size of the world’s population). These
beliefs may be caused by various observed and unobserved factors.
Would it be sensible to estimate the coefficient on these observed
factors (the extent to which they change an individual’s belief) by
asking an individual an SWB question? That would be absurd,
because SWB answers are not caused by beliefs about the world’s
population. But—if SWB answers are indeed expressions of the
respondent’s hedonic state, not his evaluation of how fully his
preferences are realized—why is it less absurd to use SWB answers in
estimating preference utility?
Some of these difficulties (although not the last) can be handled
via instrumental-variable techniques. But these are used fairly
infrequently in the SWB literature, given that valid instruments for
118
income (or other attributes) seem difficult to find in this context.
Introducing preference (not merely scale) heterogeneity just further
complicates the picture.
C. The Advantages of Stated-Preference Surveys
A mere recitation of the various pitfalls in using SWB surveys to
estimate preference-utility may ring hollow. The reader may wonder:
“Isn’t the issue comparative? Unless you can identify a better
117. See Clark et al., supra note 114, at C119.
118. See Powdthavee, supra note 114, at 79; Paul Dolan & Robert Metcalfe, Comparing
Willingness-to-Pay and Subjective Well-Being in the Context of Non-Market Goods 20 (Ctr. for
Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 890, 2008).
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technique, these pitfalls are unavoidable.” But there is a better
technique: stated-preference surveys.
Stated-preference surveys are widely used in applied economics,
particularly to infer individuals’ WTP/WTA amounts for nonmarket
goods, and also to make other sorts of inferences about preference
119
utility. In the form now favored by the economists who use this
methodology, stated-preference surveys ask respondents to rank
120
hypothetical policies, outcomes, attribute bundles, or other items.
For example, a survey might show the respondent pictures of current
air quality versus what the air would look like if a particular
regulatory policy were put into place. It might then inform the
respondent that the costs of the regulation would be passed on to
consumers in the form of higher prices, and ask whether the
respondent would approve implementing the policy, given an
expected increase of some amount in the total cost of certain goods
he customarily purchases. A “yes” answer might be taken to imply
that the respondent is willing to pay at least that amount for the
improvement in air quality.
Although now widespread, stated-preference surveys remain
121
controversial. Fully engaging that debate is well beyond the scope of
this Article. Rather, the claim I wish to make in this Section is

119. For overviews of this approach, see generally IAN J. BATEMAN ET AL., ECONOMIC
VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL (2002); RICHARD T.
CARSON, CONTINGENT VALUATION: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
(2011); HANDBOOK ON CONTINGENT VALUATION (Anna Alberini & James R. Kahn eds.,
2006); A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION (Patricia A. Champ, Kevin J. Boyle & Thomas
C. Brown eds., 2003); VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL AMENITIES USING STATED CHOICE
STUDIES (Barbara J. Kanninen ed., 2007); VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES:
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD IN THE US, EU, AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Ian J. Bateman & Kenneth G. Willis eds., 2001); Richard T. Carson
& W. Michael Hanemann, Contingent Valuation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ECONOMICS 821 (Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2005); L. Venkatachalam, The
Contingent Valuation Method: A Review, 24 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 89 (2004).
120. A different format, less utilized at present, is an “open-ended” question that asks for
the maximum the respondent is willing to pay for some good.
121. See supra note 119; see also FUJIWARA & CAMPBELL, supra note 11; Matthew D.
Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875 (2006); Richard T. Carson, Nicholas
E. Flores & Norman F. Meade, Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence, 19 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 173 (2001); Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov & David Schkade, Economic
Preferences or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, 19 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 203 (1999); Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as
a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161 (2005); Robert Sugden,
Anomalies and Stated Preference Techniques: A Framework for a Discussion of Coping
Strategies, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 1 (2005).

ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1564

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/15/2013 2:56 PM

[Vol. 62:1509

conditional. If individuals have sufficiently well-behaved preferences
to allow for a preference-based account of well-being, and if surveys
are an appropriate methodology for estimating these preferences,
stated-preference surveys dominate SWB surveys. The former are
clearly better in some relevant respects, and no worse in all other.
A preference-based account of well-being requires that
122
individuals’ rankings satisfy formal rationality requirements. The
content of such requirements is contested, but they include—at a bare
minimum—transitivity. Unless a ranking satisfies formal rationality
constraints, it may not even be characterizable as a preference, and in
any event, would be irrational and normatively suspect.
Some critiques of stated-preference surveys point to anomalies
123
suggesting a violation of rationality requirements.
Scope
insensitivity (also known as “embedding”) is one such anomaly:
individuals’ WTP/WTA amounts do not vary appropriately with
change in the scope of the good being valued. For example, a
respondent’s willingness to pay for a reduction in fatality risk may
increase very little even as the risk reduction is doubled or
124
quadrupled. Large WTP/WTA disparities are another. The amount
of money that the respondent requires in compensation for not
having some good (her WTA) may be much larger than what she
would pay to have it (her WTP)—suggesting that she is envisioning
attribute packages as losses or gains from a reference point, arguably
a kind of formal irrationality.
However, anyone proposing to use SWB surveys as evidence of
preference utility must presuppose that such irrationalities are not
widespread or entrenched (for example, that they can be overcome
125
via sufficient debiasing or other steps to “construct” well-behaved
preferences). If scope insensitivities, WTP/WTA disparities, and the
like really prove that most individuals are too irrational to meet the
formal requirements of a preference-based account of well-being, the
conclusion should be that we must reject this account entirely, thus

122. See supra text accompanying notes 35–48 (discussing the laundering of preferences).
123. See, e.g., Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, J. ECON.
PERSP., Fall 2012, at 43, 46–49.
124. This is a violation of expected utility theory. See James K. Hammitt & John D.
Graham, Willingness To Pay for Health Protection: Inadequate Sensitivity to Probability?, 18 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 33, 34–35 (1999).
125. John W. Payne, James R. Bettman & David A. Schkade, Measuring Constructed
Preferences: Towards a Building Code, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243 (1999).
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undermining not only stated-preference surveys, but also the PR
126
defense of SWB surveys.
A second, quite familiar, critique of stated-preference surveys is
less radical. It asserts that behavioral (“revealed preference”) data is
stronger evidence of individuals’ real preferences than survey data. In
particular, it is claimed, individuals have strategic grounds to answer
stated-preference questions insincerely. It is also suggested (a kind of
nonidealization point) that respondents have no “skin in the game,”
no incentive to seriously consider what their preferences are, because
any answer they give is costless. Stated-preference surveys are
therefore (it is claimed) subject to “hypothetical bias,” whereby
individuals tend to articulate higher monetary values for goods than
127
they would expend in real transactions.
Undoubtedly some types of stated-preference surveys are
vulnerable to strategic bias, hypothetical bias, or other slippage
between respondents’ genuine preferences and their answers to the
survey questions. But that would also surely be true of some types of
128
SWB surveys. Nor is there any reason to believe that survey design
improvements intended to mitigate these flaws are especially
applicable to the SWB format.
Conversely, if the flaws just mentioned are mitigatable—if
properly designed surveys are a useful tool to infer preference
utility—there are several strong considerations in favor of the statedpreference approach.
First, as just mentioned, preferences must satisfy formal
rationality requirements. Some who advocate a preference-based
account of well-being go further, arguing that the preferrer must meet
various additional laundering conditions, such as being well-informed,
calm and deliberative. Efforts to debias respondents, and to furnish

126. Cf. Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, “Coherent Arbitrariness”:
Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73, 73 (2003) (finding that
market behavior may not reveal stable underlying preferences).
127. See CARSON, supra note 119, at 13 (noting that hypothetical bias and strategic
misstatement are two enduring concerns about stated-preference surveys).
128. See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, The Use of Happiness Research for Public Policy, 38
SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 659, 670 (2012) (“When happiness indicators influence the behaviour
of political actors and their policy choices, individuals have an incentive to misstate their wellbeing.”).
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information, are a standard feature of stated-preference surveys, but
129
not SWB surveys.
Perhaps this is remediable. For example, SWB respondents
could, in principle, be provided a mini-course in utility theory (so that
they understand how preferences are supposed to behave, and what
the ordinal or cardinal utility number attached to an attribute bundle
is meant to represent). Each could be given information about her
actual attribute bundle, and also asked to carefully consider whether
she would prefer that bundle to various counterfactual bundles. And
only then would respondents be asked, “How satisfied are you with
your own life?” or, less elliptically, “What is your current degree of
utility?” But this would represent a fairly radical change in how SWB
surveys are actually conducted.
A second and more fundamental advantage of the statedpreference approach is that it is robust to preference heterogeneity—
both interpersonal and intrapersonal. Howard at Time 1 (Howard1)
may have different preferences from Howard at Time 2 (Howard2),
and both of the Howards’ preferences may differ from Robert’s. The
stated-preference approach can, in principle, accommodate this
heterogeneity. Howard1, Howard2, and Robert can each be asked to
rank a set of possible attribute bundles. If each has a different
ranking, that will show up in the data.
By contrast, the SWB format presupposes some substantial
degree of preference homogeneity. Even if Howard1, Howard2, and
Robert each accurately expresses his preference utility for his current
bundle, there is no way to infer how any of them would rank the set
of possible bundles if we allow each ranking to be different.
The fundamental point is that, in the stated-preference format,
multiple possible attribute bundles are presented to each
130
respondent. The respondent just tells us directly what his ranking is.
129. For one particularly intensive effort to encourage deliberation about preferences as
part of a stated-preference survey, see Douglas MacMillan, Nick Hanley & Nele Lienhoop,
Contingent Valuation: Environmental Polling or Preference Engine?, 60 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
299 (2006).
130. In practice, stated-preference practitioners often use a so-called “dichotomous choice”
framework which, in effect, asks each respondent to rank only two attribute bundles (bundles
consisting of some level of a good and some amount of income) out of a larger set.
Dichotomous-choice questions, besides having desirable properties as regards strategic bias, are
less cognitively demanding than questions asking the respondent for fuller ranking information.
Answers to a survey posing each respondent a dichotomous-choice question over some pair of
bundles, together with assumptions about the homogeneity of respondents’ preferences, can be
used to infer the common preferences over the entire set. But it is also quite possible to ask each
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In the SWB format, each member of a group is asked to articulate his
preference utility for one bundle (his current one). Information about
counterfactuals—namely, whether an individual would prefer or
disprefer his current bundle to a different one—is not elicited.
Without such information, we can only infer whether someone would
prefer or disprefer his current bundle to a different one if we assume
that his preferences are to some degree homogeneous with the holder
131
of that other bundle.
Third, and equally importantly, stated-preference surveys do not
ask the respondent to translate her ranking of bundles into a utility
scale and to express her ranking by telling us her utility. Instead, she
is just asked for the ranking. The whole problem of scale
heterogeneity, a deep difficulty for SWB surveys (as evidence of
preference utility), is a non-issue for the stated-preference format.
This is certainly true if we allow for interrespondent preference
heterogeneity. And it is true even if we do combine the statedpreference format with assumptions about preference homogeneity
so as to increase the inferential power of this approach.
For example, imagine that we try to infer how each in a group of
respondents would rank a fairly large set of attribute bundles. It
seems overwhelming to present the whole set to each, and so we
assume that all have the same preferences. With this assumption in
hand, we could administer a stated-preference survey, asking each
respondent to rank a particular subset of the larger set. With this
information in hand, together with formal features of preferences
(transitivity) and the homogeneity assumption, we can reach a
conclusion about how each in the group ranks the larger set. Nothing
in this conclusion depends upon a further assumption that each in the
group expresses these common preferences via a common utility
scale.

respondent to rank three or more bundles, or to pick the most preferred of three or more
bundles; and stated-preference surveys sometimes do pose such questions, as in the so-called
“choice experiment” or “contingent ranking” format.
131. Some critics of using stated-preference surveys to estimate WTP/WTA values have
argued that these surveys impose a cognitive burden by requiring respondents to rank multiple
bundles—and have suggested that such burden is reduced by the SWB format. See, e.g., Frey et
al., supra note 11, at 148. But this cognitive-burden defense of the SWB format is persuasive
only if SWB surveys are taken as evidence of something about respondents other than their
preferences. The “burden” of ranking multiple alternatives is an inextricable part of having a
preference.
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Fourth, stated-preference surveys are less susceptible to the
miscommunication difficulties that affect SWB surveys. It is hard to
misunderstand the question, “Which would you choose?” or “Which
do you prefer?” By contrast, the person asked “How satisfied are you
with your life?” or “What is your current utility?” (let alone, “How
happy are you?”) might well misunderstand the question as
requesting a measure of affect or good feeling—experience utility—
rather than a measure of preference realization.
III. SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING SURVEYS AS EVIDENCE OF
EXPERIENCE UTILITY
The PR defense sees SWB surveys as evidencing preference
utility, a measure of the extent to which individuals’ preferences are
realized (with individuals permitted to have an intrinsic preference
for items that are at least partly nonexperiential, such as
consumption, health, liberty, accomplishment, knowledge, and so
forth). By contrast, the EQ defense argues that SWB surveys provide
useful information about the quality of individuals’ mental states.
This defense is, in a way, much more straightforward. Although
individuals are not infallible about the content of their mental states,
surely each individual is generally more epistemically reliable about
what she thinks and feels than about the occurrence of what she
wants. Moreover, it seems straightforward to design survey questions
focusing on experiential quality: for example, “How happy are you?”
Indeed, many scholars in the SWB literature offer (what appears
to be) some version of the EQ defense. The most prominent example
is Daniel Kahneman, who argues that information about experience
utility should play a substantial role in structuring governmental
choices. Kahneman and his collaborators (for short, “Kahneman”)
have pioneered a novel framework (“objective happiness”) for
measuring experience utility, and have empirically implemented this
132
framework in several large-scale studies. But Kahneman is hardly
alone in seeing SWB surveys as evidencing experience utility. There
are numerous other SWB researchers who present—or at least seem
to present—the EQ defense.
That defense, once more, can take a strong or weak form. In the
strong form, the EQ defense of SWB surveys endorses
experientialism about well-being. A leading example of this approach

132. See infra Part III.B.
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is the best-selling book, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science,
written by Richard Layard, a prominent SWB researcher. Section A
responds to Layard’s arguments and, more generally, criticizes the
strong EQ defense.
The weak EQ defense is more promising. It refrains from
endorsing experientialism about well-being. Experientialism about
well-being is, at a minimum, normatively controversial. The weak EQ
defense of SWB surveys declines to take sides in that thorny debate.
It claims only that good experiences are one aspect of well-being—a
claim which seems very hard to deny.
More problematic is the assertion that policymakers should take
account of the experiential impact of governmental policies via SWB
surveys. In Section B, I illustrate the difficulties with the weak EQ
defense of SWB surveys via a close analysis of Kahneman’s “objective
happiness” framework. Kahneman’s work is by far the most
systematic attempt, to date, to develop a policy-relevant measure of
mental states. And Kahneman now acknowledges (or at least is
willing to entertain) that well-being has nonmental aspects. The
“objective happiness” framework should thus be understood as a
concrete elaboration of the weak EQ defense: one that sees SWB
surveys as evidence of experiential quality, and experiential quality as
one important determinant (among others) of well-being.
Key objections to the “objective happiness” framework are its
implausible presuppositions regarding temporal separability and,
even more fundamentally, the separability of the hedonic from the
nonhedonic. Relatedly, the framework offers no guidance in how
policymakers should integrate information about hedonic utility with
nonhedonic information. Finally, although the theoretical elaboration
of “objective happiness” uses an “observer” to make time-tradeoff
judgments so as to cardinalize hedonic utilities, the “observer” is not
to be found in Kahneman’s empirical studies, and even the theoretical
elaboration fails to allow for heterogeneity in observer
judgments/preferences.
Section C sketches a different and arguably more promising
approach to integrating information about experiential quality into
policy choice: an approach that includes happiness as one of the
entries in individuals’ preference utility functions, and that employs

133. LAYARD, supra note 10.
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revealed or stated-preference studies to estimate the extent to which
preference utility depends upon happiness.
A. Experientialism about Well-Being: The “Strong” ExperienceQuality Defense of Subjective Well-Being Surveys
Experientialism about well-being has a distinguished intellectual
history. Bentham, of course, was an experientialist, and so (in a
134
different way) were John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick. But,
more recently, the view fell into philosophical disfavor. The most
influential twentieth-century work of moral philosophy, John Rawls’s
135
A Theory of Justice, adopts a preference-based view of welfare,
rather than equating well-being with pain and pleasure or, more
136
The other leading contemporary
generally, good experiences.
philosophical works on well-being (here, I am thinking of the work of
137
138
139
Richard Brandt,
James Griffin,
John Finnis,
Martha
140
141
Nussbaum, and Wayne Sumner ) are also nonexperientialist.
Indeed, for a time, Robert Nozick’s discussion of the “experience
machine” was generally seen by philosophers as a decisive refutation
142
of experientialism. Over the last decade or so, some scholars have
143
pushed back against this conventional wisdom. Still, it remains the
case that experientialism about welfare is a philosophically
controversial position. As already explained in Part I, two widely
accepted classes of well-being accounts—preferentialism (with the
special exception of a preferentialist view that embraces an

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

SUMNER, supra note 26, at 83–92.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
See id. at 358–80.
See generally RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979).
See generally JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND
MORAL IMPORTANCE (1986).
139. See generally FINNIS, supra note 42.
140. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 31.
141. See generally SUMNER, supra note 26.
142. See, e.g., Sharon Hewitt, What Do Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine Really
Tell Us About Hedonism?, 151 PHIL. STUD. 331, 332 (2010); Matthew Silverstein, In Defense of
Happiness: A Response to the Experience Machine, 26 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 279, 281–82
(2000).
143. See, e.g., ROGER CRISP, REASONS AND THE GOOD (2006); FRED FELDMAN, PLEASURE
AND THE GOOD LIFE: CONCERNING THE NATURE, VARIETIES, AND PLAUSIBILITY OF
HEDONISM (2004); FRED FELDMAN, WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED HAPPINESS? (2010); Mark
Bernstein, Well-Being, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 39 (1998); Torbjörn Tännsjö, Narrow Hedonism, 8 J.
HAPPINESS STUD. 79 (2007).

ADLER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/15/2013 2:56 PM

HAPPINESS SURVEYS AND PUBLIC POLICY

1571

144

experientialist conception of “self-interested” ) and the objectivegood approach—reject the experientialism requirement. Accounts
within these classes reject the proposition that the only way to
directly change someone’s well-being is by changing the content of
her mental states (what she thinks, feels, remembers, and so forth).
In Happiness, however, Layard adopts a Benthamite view of
well-being and of the proper goals for social policy. He writes, “I
believe that Bentham’s idea”—that “all laws and all actions should
aim at producing the greatest possible happiness”—“was right and
145
that we should fearlessly adopt it.”
Happiness almost completely ignores the contemporary
philosophical debates about well-being. Perhaps that is not surprising,
given academic specialization (Layard is an economist) and the
book’s aim to reach a popular audience. Still, one can ask: has Layard
advanced or at least sketched plausible arguments for why
governmental policy should be solely focused on promoting individual
happiness, rather than nonexperiential features of individual lives
(except as an instrumental means to more happiness)?
Layard argues as follows:
Why should we take the greatest happiness as the goal for our
society? Why not some other goal—or indeed many? What about
health, autonomy, accomplishment or freedom? The problem with
many goals is that they often conflict, and then we have to balance
one against the other. So we naturally look for one ultimate goal
that enables us to judge other goals by how they contribute to it.
Happiness is that ultimate goal because, unlike all other goals, it
is self-evidently good. If we are asked why happiness matters, we
can give no further, external reason. It just obviously does matter.
As the American Declaration of Independence says, it is a “selfevident” objective.
By contrast, if I ask you why you want people to be healthier, you
can probably think of reasons why—people should not be in pain,
they should be able to enjoy life and so on. Similarly, if I ask you
about autonomy you will point out that people feel better if they can

144. See supra text accompanying note 48; infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text.
145. LAYARD, supra note 10, at 111–12. Layard’s book was originally published in 2005.
Citations are to the revised and updated edition, published in 2011, which added a new part but
did not change the main text. See id. at xiii. The new part adds little to the original argument for
happiness maximization, except a slight addendum to the argument about the uniquely selfevident intrinsic value of happiness. See infra note 154.
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control their own lives. Likewise, freedom is good because slavery,
prison and the secret police lead to nothing but misery.
So goods like health, autonomy and freedom are “instrumental”
goods—we can give further, more ultimate reasons for valuing
them. . . .
To help us promote the greatest happiness, we obviously need to
understand what conditions affect people’s happiness, and by how
much. This is now becoming possible on an empirical basis. . . . But
unless we can justify our goals by how people feel, there is a real
danger of paternalism. We ought never to say: this is good for you,
even though it will never make you or others feel better. On the
contrary, if we want to measure the quality of life, it must be based
146
on how people feel.

After addressing objections to happiness-maximization, Layard
rearticulates his position in this way: “So we come back to the central
idea of a humane ethic that values what people want for themselves,
for their children and for their fellow citizens. And that is their
147
happiness.”
In these passages, one can tease out three separate lines of
defense of experientialism about well-being. None are particularly
persuasive.
(1) Monism: “The problem with many goals is that they often
148
conflict.”
A view that equates well-being and happiness is
unidimensional or “monistic.” By contrast, if we allow well-being to
depend upon both happiness and nonexperiential items such as
health, autonomy, accomplishment or freedom, it becomes
multidimensional. On such an account, how is government supposed
to choose a course of action when the dimensions conflict?
What this argument overlooks is that there are very welldeveloped techniques in economics for assigning a given individual a
single utility number as a function of her attainment on multiple
149
dimensions. Conversely, experientialism is hardly a sure recipe for
avoiding the complexities of multidimensionality. On the most
plausible accounts, experiential quality is itself multidimensional: a
matter of good perceptions, cognitions, and memories, not just pains
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 112–13 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 112.
See generally RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE
OBJECTIVES: PREFERENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS (1993).
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and pleasures. Many SWB researchers see subjective well-being
(good mental states) as a composite of positive and negative affect
150
and feelings of satisfaction. Even the narrower, Benthamite view
may not really be monistic. As discussed at greater length below,
painfulness and pleasantness may turn out to be separate
151
dimensions.
(2) Only Happiness Has Self-Evident Intrinsic Value: “Happiness
is that ultimate goal because, unlike all other goals, it is self-evidently
good. . . . [G]oods like health, autonomy and freedom are
‘instrumental’ goods—we can give further, more ultimate reasons for
152
valuing them.” Layard’s idea of “self-evidence” invokes a standard
feature of normative reasoning, namely that some normative
153
propositions might be supported by direct appeal to intuitions.
Layard is surely correct that many of his (and this Article’s) readers
will strongly intuit that happiness has intrinsic welfare value:
happiness, as such, increases well-being. But many readers will also
intuit that physical health, autonomy, knowledge, relationships, or
accomplishment have intrinsic welfare value. This relates to
pluralism/monism: there is nothing at all confused in having the
intuition that multiple types of individual attributes, both happiness
and other goods, are intrinsic welfare components.
In characterizing happiness as a “self-evident” good, Layard not
only appeals to intuitions in favor of happiness, but also emphasizes
the strength of such intuitions. Assume, arguendo, that intuitions
concerning the welfare relevance of health (for example) are
generally weaker than intuitions concerning the welfare relevance of
happiness. It would be a fallacy to conclude that only happiness, not
health, has intrinsic welfare value. If I intuit that proposition P* is
true, then (ceteris paribus) my normative views should be consistent
with P*, even if I hold the intuition with less than complete certainty,
and even if there is some other proposition P (logically consistent
with P*) that I intuit more strongly.
In principle, Layard might try to undercut intuitions concerning
the welfare relevance of nonexperiential items in a different way, by

150. For a fuller discussion of the multidimensionality of good experiences, see infra notes
197–200 and accompanying text.
151. See infra Part III.B.1.
152. LAYARD, supra note 10, at 113.
153. See NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1996).
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arguing that (a) such intuitions do not survive idealization (with full
information, and thinking rationally, no one intuits that health, etc.,
has intrinsic welfare value), or that (b) such intuitions are much less
widely shared than the intuition regarding the value of happiness. The
first tack seems a nonstarter—undercut by the many serious thinkers
who have embraced nonexperientialist accounts. The second tack is
empirically speculative. Layard doesn’t present (or attempt to
154
present) evidence to support it. And evolutionary considerations
actually suggest that intuitions supporting the intrinsic significance of
at least some nonexperiential items are likely to be quite widely
155
shared.
Layard’s key argument against the intrinsic value of health,
autonomy, and freedom is yet another one: namely, that we can give
instrumental reasons for promoting these items. This argument is
fallacious. Something can be both intrinsically and instrumentally
valuable. In particular, imagine that there are two intrinsic
components of welfare: being happy and being healthy. Then we can
reason instrumentally about health (asking about the effect of healthpromotion policies on happiness), but we can also point to the healthpromotion effect of a policy as an intrinsic reason to support it.
Symmetrically, we can reason instrumentally about happiness by
asking about the effect of happiness-promotion policies on health.
The health benefits of affects and cognitions are in fact a large topic
156
of research among public health researchers!
Thus, the premise that nonexperiential items possess
instrumental value, as causal precursors to happiness, does not imply
the conclusion that they lack intrinsic value.
(3) Paternalism: “[U]nless we can justify our goals by how people
157
feel, there is a real danger of paternalism.” Government acts
paternalistically toward some individual when it restricts her choices
for her own good—when it limits what she can do, not because of
third-party effects, but because it believes that she will fail to promote
her own well-being.

154. In the new part to his book, added in the revised and updated edition, Layard claims—
without empirical support—that happiness “is the only good which would be generally accepted
as an end in itself.” LAYARD, supra note 10, at 240.
155. See ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND
PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR 296–327 (1998).
156. See Diener & Seligman, supra note 10, at 13–15.
157. LAYARD, supra note 10, at 113.
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Far from being antipaternalistic, experientialism has the real
158
If citizens self-interestedly prefer
potential for paternalism.
nonexperiential items, a government with a mandate to promote good
experiences has a justification for restricting or altering their choices.
For example, if mental health interventions are especially conducive
to happiness, but some individuals have a substantial intrinsic desire
to be physically healthy, an experientialist government might try to
tilt those individuals’ health expenditures away from their preferred
mix as between physical and mental health. It is preference views—
drawing an equivalence between what someone wants (under
stipulated conditions) and what is good for that person—that have the
159
conceptual resources to resist paternalism. Conversely, the possible
disjunction between the course of action that maximizes the
realization of someone’s self-interested preferences, and the course of
action that maximizes the quality of her feelings or experiences,
renders an experiential account potentially paternalist.
Layard obscures this potential via his assertion that individuals
self-interestedly prefer their own happiness. “So we come back to the
central idea of a humane ethic that values what people want for
themselves, for their children and for their fellow citizens. And that is
160
their happiness.” But this is an empirical assertion—one that
Layard does not back up with evidence, and one that the studies
reviewed in Part I.B. do not clearly support.
Of course, the sheer fact that a well-being account is paternalistic
does not provide a decisive reason to reject it. Intuitively, some
individuals do fail to promote their own well-being. But SWB
scholars such as Layard should not inflate the virtues of
experientialism by obscuring where it stands on paternalism.
I have parsed Layard’s brief for experientialism and found it
wanting. But better arguments for his position might be available.
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur have
recently offered a lengthy defense of experientially focused policy

158. Robert Sugden, Capability, Happiness, and Opportunity, in CAPABILITIES AND
HAPPINESS 299, 300 (Luigino Bruni, Flavio Comim & Maurizio Pugno eds., 2008).
159. To be sure, preference views become increasingly paternalistic as they impose
increasingly stringent rationality and informational conditions on preferences. The preference
component of any such view pushes against paternalism, whereas the idealization component
pushes toward it.
160. LAYARD, supra note 10, at 124.
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161

And, as mentioned, some contemporary academic
analysis.
philosophers have tried to mount a case for (or at least deflate some
162
of the standard objections to) experientialism.
To my mind, the strongest reason to endorse an experientialism
requirement is a reason that Layard does not mention: the “good-for”
163
aspect of welfare. Well-being is subject-relative goodness. Some
occurrence enhances Sonya’s well-being only if it is good for Sonya,
rather than merely being good in an impersonal sense, or good for
someone else. Call this the “non-remoteness” constraint on well164
being: an occurrence has a direct impact on someone’s welfare only
if it is not too “remote” from her.
At first blush, the non-remoteness constraint presents a plausible
case for experientialism. As Shelly Kagan explains:
Suppose I meet a stranger on a train. He tells me his story, and I
form the desire that he succeed in his projects. We then part, and I
never hear of him or even think of him again. If he does in fact
succeed, then my desire has been satisfied. According to the desire
theory, then, this makes me better off. But this is intuitively an
absurd claim. Obviously my level of well-being is not affected at all
by the success of the stranger. . . .
This suggests that the unrestricted desire theory [of well-being] is
hopelessly broad. A theory of well-being must explain which facts
constitute my being better off. So they must be facts about me. Since
my desires can range over facts that have nothing whatsoever to do
with me, the satisfaction of such desires cannot constitute my wellbeing. . . .
From this perspective, the position of mental statism no longer
seems so arbitrary. At least it seems to keep the content of wellbeing within reasonable bounds, for facts about my mental states are
certainly facts about me. In contrast, it is far from clear whether
anything external to my mind . . . can count as—in the relevant

161. See, e.g., Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 10;
Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Well-Being Analysis, supra note 10.
162. See supra note 143.
163. See SUMNER, supra note 26; Bernstein, supra note 143, at 45–46; Shelly Kagan, The
Limits of Well-Being, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, June 1992, at 169, 171–72.
164. The word “direct” is needed because remote occurrences might have an instrumental,
causal, impact on someone’s well-being.
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sense—facts about me. If not, then the limits of well-being must be
165
drawn at the limits of our minds.

The “stranger” case described by Kagan derives originally from
166
philosopher Derek Parfit. Eric Posner and I provided a similar case
in our book on cost-benefit analysis, involving a person named Sheila
and an endangered species, the Sri Lankan squirrel.
One outcome involves . . . the continued existence of the Sri
Lankan squirrel . . . ; the other is the extinction of this species. Sheila
has never traveled to Sri Lanka, and never intends to, nor is she an
environmentalist who’s made species preservation her life’s work,
but she still (slightly, say) prefers the first outcome because she
believes that morality includes environmental values disfavoring the
disappearance of species. It seems odd to say that the nonextinction
167
of the squirrel makes Sheila better off.

The “stranger” and Sri Lankan squirrel cases underscore the nonremoteness constraint on well-being. More specifically, within the
confines of a preference-based account of welfare, they show the
need to restrict the category of welfare-relevant preferences. The
cases illustrate that someone might have a fully laundered preference
(a preference that is well-informed, rational, intelligible, and so forth)
for outcome x over y, and still not be better off in x than y. In order to
survive the remoteness objection, the preference-based account must
say that person i is better off in x than y if and only if i has a selfinterested, laundered preference for x over y. The reasons thus to
restrict the category of welfare-relevant preferences include not just
our intuitive reactions to particular hypothetical cases, but also
deeper considerations regarding the possibility of self-sacrifice and of
168
moral reasoning.
Kagan concludes, however, that the non-remoteness constraint
does not, on balance, argue for experientialism. I agree with Kagan.
In particular, the literature on preferentialism has offered at least
four possible general solutions to the problem of differentiating self169
interested from non-self-interested preferences. (1) Experientialism:
An individual’s preference is self-interested if and only if the

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Kagan, supra note 163, at 171–72.
See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 494 (1987).
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 32, at 34.
See id. at 34–35; ADLER, supra note 27, at 174–78.
See ADLER, supra note 27, at 178–81.
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170

fundamental arguments for the preference are the individual’s
mental states. (2) Experientialism plus physicalism: An individual’s
preference is self-interested if and only if the fundamental arguments
for the preference are the individual’s mental states or physical states.
(3) Existence-entailment: An individual’s preference is self-interested
if and only if the realization of the preference entails the individual’s
existence. (4) Sympathy: An individual’s preference is self-interested
if and only if based in self-sympathy, an attitude of care and concern
for herself.
The experientialist conception of “self-interested” strikes me as
too narrow. Surely occurrences within a person’s physical body are
not “remote” from her. As Kagan explains, even if we insist that a
preference is self-interested only if its fundamental arguments are the
person’s nonrelational attributes, that would lead us to conception (2)
171
in the previous paragraph, not (1). We get from a nonrelationality
requirement to experientialism only by adopting a controversial view
of personal identity—namely, that a particular human person is just a
bundle of psychological properties, rather than a particular human
172
being who has a brain and a body. Moreover, I would go wider than
experientialism plus physicalism. Given that practical rationality,
theoretical rationality, and affiliation are three central capacities of
human persons—the capacities to make choices in the pursuit of
goals, to acquire knowledge, and to form relationships with others—it
seems to me that preferences for success in the exercise of those
capacities can count as self-interested even if outside the scope of
conceptions (1) and (2). Such preferences are not merely
173
“intelligible” (as I discussed in Part I), but intelligible as a matter of
self-interest. A second case that Posner and I discussed in our book,
174
the case of the deceived scholar, illustrates this point.

170. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
171. Kagan, supra note 163, at 180–89.
172. See generally DAVID DEGRAZIA, HUMAN IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS (2005); ERIC T.
OLSON, THE HUMAN ANIMAL: PERSONAL IDENTITY WITHOUT PSYCHOLOGY (1997).
173. See supra notes 34–47 and accompanying text.
174. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 32, at 30. Let me modify the case somewhat to highlight
the connection with goals, knowledge, and relationships. Imagine that David, an academic
scientist, works hard at his research. He hopes to make a scientific discovery and to be respected
for doing so by his colleagues. In considering possible outcomes, David says that he prefers x
(an outcome in which he actually discovers some new and significant scientific fact), as opposed
to y (an outcome in which he falsely believes to have done so, abetted in this belief by
colleagues who want to spare his feelings but pity David behind his back). Even though David’s
mental states are identical in these possible outcomes, there are various important respects in
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Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur argue that I have “directly
contradict[ed]” myself in denying that the squirrel’s survival benefits
Sheila, and yet rejecting the experientialist conception of self-interest,
175
conception (1). Their characterization, if accurate, would also hold
true of anyone else who adopts conception (2), (3), (4), or for that
matter any view which analyzes self-interested preferences other than
as preferences for experiences. But, in fact, there is no contradiction
here: just a position intermediate between the narrow insistence that
what is good for me must occur within my head, and an overbroad
willingness to include the realization of any preference (including
Sheila’s, or a preference for the stranger’s success in Parfit’s case) as
improving my welfare.
The brief discussion of the last several paragraphs will hardly
satisfy the proponent of experientialism. The non-remoteness
problem is very difficult, and the experientialist solution to that
problem certainly does deserve close and serious consideration.
Although I believe that this argument for experientialism fails—as do
others advanced by contemporary philosophical experientialists, and
by Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur—I lack space to pursue the
analysis here. Notwithstanding Nozick’s “experience machine,”
experientialism should not be rejected out of hand.
which his preference seems self-interested whereas Sheila’s does not: in y he has failed at his
career goal, he knows less (and has made no contribution to human knowledge), and a thread of
deceit runs through his relationships with his colleagues.
Note that both conceptions (3) and (4) would count David’s preference for x as selfinterested. A preference that I contribute to finding a cure for cancer—by contrast with a
preference that a cure for cancer be discovered—is existence-entailing, because all outcomes in
which I do not exist are ranked equal by the first but not the second preference. David’s
preference is that he make a scientific breakthrough and that he be respected by his colleagues
as a result. Moreover, someone caring about David (whether David himself, or someone else)
would be motivated to pursue x. For example, if David has a sympathetic friend who knows of
David’s capacity for self-deception, the propensities of David’s colleagues, and so forth, and
believes that David’s research is heading down a false path—and thus taking David in the
direction of y not x—the friend might try to get David to redirect his research.
175. Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 10, at 1621. They
also point out that an account of self-interest which categorizes as “self-interested” the deceived
scholar’s preference for genuine academic success (as opposed to the mere belief thereof) also
thus categorizes the preference for success of a “driven scholar” willing to sacrifice his happiness
and family life. Id. at 1625–26. This is true. But it is a further question whether this latter
preference survives full information and rational reflection on the driven scholar’s part, and yet
a further question whether it would be widely shared (a point relevant to interpersonal
comparisons, see ADLER, supra note 27, at 185–225). Note, here, that the critic of the
experientialism requirement has a pretty easy argumentative burden. What she needs to show is
that there are some cases in which someone’s well-being is directly improved by nonexperiential
changes, not that such changes always override experiential losses.
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Reciprocally, however, SWB scholars tempted to equate wellbeing and subjective well-being should recognize that they are
entering a hornet’s nest of disputation, and should be prepared to do
serious normative battle in defense of experientialism. Lacking the
appetite or ammunition for such battle, the SWB scholar might
instead claim that good experiences are at least one aspect of wellbeing, whether or not the sole determinant.
That claim is hard to dispute. But does it justify the use of SWB
surveys as a basis for policy choice? It is to that question that we now
turn.
B. “Objective Happiness” and the “Weak” Experience-Quality
Defense
This Section discusses Kahneman’s “objective happiness”
176
approach. I remind the reader that “Kahneman” is shorthand for
Kahneman and the distinguished collaborators with whom he has coauthored the theoretical and empirical articles developing this
framework.
Kahneman disavows (or at least does not commit himself to) an
experientialist conception of well-being. He writes:
Defining happiness by the temporal distribution of experienced
affect appears very narrow, and so it is. The concept of objective
happiness is not intended to stand on its own and is proposed only as
a necessary element of a theory of human well-being. A
comprehensive account of well-being inevitably brings in
philosophical considerations and a moral conception of “the good
life,” which are not easily reduced to experienced utility. However,
good mood and enjoyment of life are not incompatible with other
176. For the theoretical elaboration of the objective-happiness framework, see Daniel
Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker & Rakesh Sarin, Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced
Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1997); Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective
Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 70, at
673 [hereinafter Kahneman, Experienced Utility]; Daniel Kahneman & Jacob Riis, Living, and
Thinking About It: Two Perspectives on Life, in THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING, supra note 1, at
285; and Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 3, 3–12 [hereinafter Kahneman, Objective Happiness].
For empirical implementation, see generally MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF
NATIONS, supra note 4; Kahneman et al., supra note 7; and Alan B. Krueger et al., Time Use
and Subjective Well-Being in France and the U.S., 93 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 7 (2009). For
further discussions of the framework, see Dolan & Kahneman, supra note 56; Daniel Kahneman
& Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 2006, at 3; Kahneman et al., supra note 10; Kahneman & Sugden, supra note
121.
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psychological criteria of well-being that have been proposed, such as
the maintenance of personal goals, social involvement, intense
absorption in activities, and a sense that life is meaningful. Clearly, a
life that is meaningful, satisfying, and cheerful should rank higher on
the scale of well-being than a life that is equally meaningful and
satisfying but sad or tense. Objective happiness is only one
177
constituent of the quality of human life, but it is a significant one.

Kahneman, here and elsewhere, tries to bolster the normative appeal
of “objective happiness” by stressing that it is “only one constituent
178
of the quality of human life.” The framework thus merits close
critical attention, not only in its own right, but as a concrete
elaboration of the weak EQ defense of SWB surveys.
The framework offers a methodology for measuring the hedonic
or affective aspect of individual experience: whether a mental state is
affectively positive or negative, that is, painful or pleasurable.
(Kahneman often uses “hedonic,” “affective,” and “pain”/“pleasure”
interchangeably, and I will follow his usage here.) An experience is
hedonically/affectively positive, according to Kahneman, if it feels
good and if the individual wants the experience to continue. An
experience is hedonically/affectively negative if it feels bad and the
individual wants it to stop.
The formal model underlying “objective happiness” presumes
that there is a neutral hedonic level, and that a given individual (the
subject), at a given moment, can meaningfully characterize her
current, momentary, mental state as affectively positive, negative, or
neutral—as hedonically better than, worse than, or equally good as
the neutral level. Moreover, she can order possible momentary
experiences within each of the two affective domains. Given two
affectively positive experiences, the first can be ranked as more, less,
or equally positive as the second—various momentary pleasures are
not just pleasures simpliciter (better than neutral), but more or less
pleasurable. Similarly, the subject can determine whether one
hedonically negative momentary experience is more or less negative
than another.

177. Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 176, at 683 (citations omitted). For other
passages in which Kahneman declines to commit himself to an experientialist account of wellbeing, see Dolan & Kahneman, supra note 56, at 229–30; Kahneman et al., supra note 176, at
377 & n.3, Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 121, at 178 n.11; Kahneman & Riis, supra note 176,
at 288–89.
178. Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 176, at 683.
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These intra-domain hedonic rankings of momentary experiences
can be represented (Kahneman assumes) by numbers—by
momentary hedonic utilities—which, thus far, are merely ordinal. If
the subject assigns -3 to momentary experience A, and -6 to
momentary experience B, those numbers mean that both are worse
than neutral, and that B is more negative than A; the numbers -3 and
-8 would equally well capture this hedonic information. In order to
cardinalize momentary utilities, Kahneman introduces an
179
“observer.” The observer ranks temporally extended episodes
(“profiles”), each consisting of a series of affective states (positive,
negative, or neutral) experienced for some length of time. The
observer’s ranking of the profiles is consistent with axioms of time
neutrality, monotonicity, and separability. Time neutrality says that
adding neutral time before or after a profile does not change where
the profile is located in the observer’s ranking. Monotonicity says that
replacing one or more positive momentary experiences within a given
profile with more intensively positive momentary experiences must
improve how the profile is ranked by the observer, and symmetrically
for negative experiences. And separability says that the ranking of
two profiles does not depend on what is experienced during moments
180
when experiential quality is the same.
If the observer’s ranking satisfies these axioms, then there is a
cardinal measure of momentary hedonic value—call it the v(.)
function—such that the observer ranks one profile over another if
and only if the sum of the duration-weighted v(.) values for the first
profile is greater than the sum of the duration-weighted v(.) values for
the second. For example, let profile P consist of experiences A, B, and
C, each for two units of time, and let P* consist of experience D for
five units. Then if the observer prefers P to P*, it will be the case that
2v(A) +2v(B) + 2v(C) > 5v(D).
The v(.) function is cardinal in the sense that its values are added
together to yield the overall value of a profile. The v(.) function,

179. See Kahneman et al., supra note 176, at 388–89, 91; Kahneman, Experienced Utility,
supra note 176, at 680–81; Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 176, at 5–6.
180. It might seem absurd to compare profiles with short temporal duration. For example, if
P consists of an hour of certain experiences, and P* an hour of different experiences, is the
observer meant to contemplate a life that endures for only an hour? Or (almost as absurdly) a
life that is entirely neutral except for P, as compared to a life entirely neutral except for P*?
Given separability, this problem can be avoided. The observer can rank P and P* by
contemplating some arbitrary profile M followed by P, as compared to the very same profile M
followed by P*.
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strictly speaking, is not unique, but unique up to a positive ratio
transformation. Thus the summation or averaging of momentary v(.)
values—and for that matter, the summation or averaging of the
181
overall values of profiles—is a meaningful operation. Because the
v(.) function is cardinal, it can serve as the theoretical basis for the
policy metrics that Kahneman recommends—gross national
happiness and other such metrics that add or average measures of
experiential quality across moments and persons.
To see how information about the observer’s ranking allows us
to arrive at a cardinal v(.) function, return to the case in which the
subject experiences A and B as both negative, and A as less negative
than B. Although this hedonic data—without more—is not sufficient
to determine whether the numbers assigned to the two experiences
are -3 and -6, or -3 and -8, imagine that we now learn that the
observer is indifferent between a profile with T hours of A experience
and a profile with T/2 hours of B experience. This information
constrains the v(.) value of A to be a negative number which is half
the v(.) value of B. Not only must it be the case that v(B) < v(A) <
0—which follows immediately from the fact that both feel painful to
the subject, and B feels more painful. In order to represent the
observer’s indifference between the two profiles just mentioned, it
must be the case that v(A)T = v(B)T/2, i.e., v(A)/v(B) = 1/2. This fact
about the observer’s ranking rules out the pair -3, -8.
To reiterate, the v(.) function is identified as that cardinal
function which both respects the hedonic intensity of momentary
affective experiences, as registered by the subject, and additively
represents the observer’s ranking of all possible temporally extended
episodes. The observer’s ranking of temporally extended episodes, as
well as the subject’s felt experience of momentary pains and
pleasures, plays a critical role—in Kahneman’s theoretical
apparatus—in arriving at v(.).

181. Assume that v(.) is such that its duration-weighted values represent the observer’s
ranking of profiles. Let v*(.) be defined as follows: for every momentary experience A, v*(A) =
av(A), where a is a positive constant. Note now that duration-weighted v*(.) values equally well
represent the observer’s ranking of profiles. Why? Let (A, B, …) be a series of momentary
experiences and (Aʹ, Bʹ, ….) a different series, with each experience A enduring for time t(A).
Then whenever v(A)t(A) + v(B)t(B) + … ≥ v(Aʹ)t(Aʹ) + v(Bʹ)t(Bʹ) + …, it will also be true that
v*(A)t(A) + v*(B)t(B) + … ≥ v*(Aʹ)t(Aʹ) + v*(Bʹ)t(Bʹ) + …. Kahneman goes further, showing
that v*(.) represents the observer’s ranking not just if, but only if, it is a positive ratio
transformation of v(.). Kahneman et al., supra note 176, at 398–402.
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The “objective happiness” framework, although an important
advance, has substantial limitations as a method for integrating
information about experiential quality into policy analysis—
limitations either in the theoretical statement of the framework or in
its empirical implementation by Kahneman. Those limitations, I
believe, are the following.
1. Is the Hedonic Aspect of Experience Unidimensional or
Bidimensional? Kahneman sees hedonic value as unidimensional.
Pleasure and pain are twin poles of a single spectrum bifurcated at
hedonic neutrality, just as positive and negative numbers correspond
to two segments of a single line running through the number 0.
This assumption of the unidimensionality of affective experience
is undermined by substantial psychological evidence for a twodimensional (or, more generally, higher dimensional) affective
182
space. Such evidence includes (1) neurological evidence, showing
that pain and pleasure arise in separate brain regions, which can be
jointly activated; (2) survey research that looks to how individuals
describe their current mental state, finding that words expressing
negative affect (words such as “distressed,” “upset,” “hostile,”
“irritable,” “scared,” “afraid,” “ashamed,” “guilty,” “nervous,” and
“jittery”) are surprisingly uncorrelated with words expressing positive
affect (words such as “attentive,” “interested,” “alert,” “excited,”
“enthusiastic,” “inspired,” “proud,” “determined,” “strong” and
“active”); (3) possible behavioral evidence of the dual activation of
positive and negative affective systems; and (4) introspection, namely
the possibility of states that are simultaneously painful and
pleasurable. Nico Frijda eloquently summarizes the introspective
evidence:

182. See, e.g., John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson, Relationship Between Attitudes and
Evaluative Space: A Critical Review, with Emphasis on the Separability of Positive and Negative
Substrates, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 401 (1994); Richard J. Davidson, Anterior Cerebral Asymmetry
and the Nature of Emotion, 20 BRAIN & COGNITION 125 (1992); Ed Diener & Robert A.
Emmons, The Independence of Positive and Negative Affect, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1105 (1985); Nico H. Frijda, Emotions and Hedonic Experience, in WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 190; Peter J. Lang, The Emotion
Probe: Studies of Motivation and Attention, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 372 (1995); Richard E.
Lucas, Ed Diener & Eunkook Suh, Discriminant Validity of Well-Being Measures, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 616 (1996); David Watson, Lee Anna Clark & Auke Tellegen,
Development and Validation of Brief Measures of Positive and Negative Affect: The PANAS
Scales, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1063 (1988); David Watson & Auke Tellegen,
Toward a Consensual Structure of Mood, 98 PSYCHOL. BULL. 219 (1985).
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In actual fact, pleasure and pain can coexist at the same moment,
and they may do so without annulling each other; masochistic
pleasure is a case in point. Simultaneous arousal of both affects leads
to complex interactions: the confusing feelings of ambivalence, the
experience of conflict, a pungency and excitement added to the
pleasure, a sweetness added to the pain, as in nostalgic
remembrance. Ambivalence as well as bittersweet experience lead
to the hypothesis that pleasure and pain are not the opposite
outcomes of one single process, but the outcome of two somewhat
183
independent processes.

How, specifically, might the multidimensionality of affect
jeopardize Kahneman’s framework for measuring hedonic value? For
simplicity, consider the two-dimensional case (the discussion
generalizes). Assume that affect is “bivalent”: positive and negative
affect are not twin poles of a single dimension, but two, orthogonal
aspects of experience that can be jointly realized: a moment of
experience can possess positive affect, negative affect, or both.
Kahneman’s formal model does not appear to cover this last case. On
that model, negative hedonic utilities are assigned to painful mental
states, representing that their affective quality is worse than
neutrality; and positive hedonic utilities are assigned to pleasurable
mental states, representing that their affective quality is better than
neutrality. But what sort of numbers should be assigned to bivalent
experiences?
Kahneman, indeed, takes very seriously the bivalence objection,
and at multiple junctures seeks to rebut it. First, Kahneman argues
that bivalent experiences occur seldomly, because the brain’s pain
and pleasure systems are mutually inhibitory.
Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson (1999) point out that positive and
negative affective states are processed by different neural systems
and may be activated concurrently. . . . However, the systems are not
functionally independent, and there is evidence that they inhibit
each other. Lang (1995) has shown, for example, that watching
pleasant pictures of food or smiling babies attenuates the startle
response to a loud sound, whereas startle is actually enhanced in the
184
presence of disgusting or horrible pictures.

This empirical response argues that, even if the “objective happiness”
measurement framework is only applicable to a subset of
183. Frijda, supra note 182, at 195.
184. Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 176, at 682.
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experiences—univalent ones—the framework remains a useful tool,
because most experiences are univalent. However, the assertion of
mutual inhibition and, thus, the rarity of bivalence, are empirically
contestable.
But Kahneman also offers a second rebuttal to the bivalence
objection—one that, if persuasive, would obviate the first. He argues
(seemingly) that the brain assigns even bivalent experiences a net
hedonic value, namely on balance positive or negative.
The bivalent nature of the Good/Bad system is not necessarily
incompatible with the notion that most moments can be usefully
characterized by a single value on a bipolar Good/Bad dimension. A
bivalent system yields a bipolar dimension if the separate
mechanisms that mediate Good and Bad are mutually inhibitory or
reciprocally innervated or if the relevant output of the system is the
difference between the levels of activity of the two
mechanisms . . . . Davidson (1992) suggested that the brain may
compute . . . the difference of the levels of activity in the separate
systems that mediate positive and negative affect. He proposed that
185
the [Good/Bad] value corresponds to the difference . . . .

If the claim, here, is that any experience feels on balance good or bad,
that claim is undermined by the introspection data which Frijda
mentions. But perhaps the claim is slightly different, namely that
every bivalent experience (although perhaps ambivalent in how it
feels) corresponds to some univalent experience for purposes of the
observer’s ranking of temporally extended experiential profiles. The
claim, thus understood, is no longer about the psychology of
momentary affect, but rather about how univalent, bivalent, and
neutral experiences fit together to determine the well-being value of
profiles. But is the claim true? For example, does a sequence of
balanced bittersweet moments, wherein pain and pleasure have equal
intensity, possess just the same well-being value as a sequence of
neutral moments with neither affective system activated?
2. Do Observers Have the Same Ranking of Hedonic Profiles?
Let us ignore, henceforth, the possibility of bivalent experiences. Let
us also place to one side deep questions regarding the accessibility of
hedonic (and more generally mental) life, namely whether a subject
can ever communicate to an observer what she (the subject) is feeling
185. Kahneman, Objective Happiness, supra note 176, at 8 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (citing Davidson, supra note 182).
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like. Assume, instead, that subjects can classify experiences as
hedonically good, bad or neutral; can rank experiences with the same
valence; can describe experiences using labels or instantaneous
utilities; and that these descriptors more or less succeed in
186
communicating to a given observer what the experiences feel like.
Kahneman’s formal model assumes a single ranking of “profiles,”
that is, temporally extended hedonic episodes. In effect, he assumes
that all observers will converge in ranking any given profile as better,
worse, or equally good as any other. But why should this be the case?
Kahneman is ambiguous as to whether observers are meant to rank
profiles by consulting (a) their preferences (Which profile would I
prefer to experience?) or (b) their judgments (Which profile do I
think is better for the subject’s well-being?). In either event, there is
no good reason, conceptual or empirical, to suppose interobserver
convergence.
Understand that interobserver convergence is not entailed by the
requirement that each observer’s v(.) function respect the subject’s
rating of momentary experiences, nor by the requirement that each
observer’s ranking of profiles satisfy axioms of time-neutrality,
separability, and monotonicity. Two observers might each satisfy all
these requirements and yet rank profiles differently.
For example, assume that the subject rates momentary
experiences A through C as better than neutral and A better than B
better than C. Observer One is indifferent between T hours of each
experience and 2T hours of the subsequent experience (so between T
hours of A and 2T hours of B, and between T hours of B and 2T
hours of C). Observer Two is indifferent between T hours of each
experience and 3T hours of the subsequent experience. Then
Observer One’s ranking is represented by the function v1(.) such that
v1(A) > v1(B) > v1(C) > 0, v1(A)/v1(B) = 2, v1(B)/v1(C) = 2. Observer
Two’s ranking is represented by the function v2(.) such that v2(A) >
v2(B) > v2(C) > 0, v2(A)/v2(B) = 3, v2(B)/v2(C) = 3.
Each observer’s ranking of profiles (using the sum of durationweighted v(.) values) satisfies the axioms of time-neutrality,
monotonicity, and separability, as well as respecting the subject’s
feelings. And yet the observers disagree in their ranking of certain
profiles. For example, it is easy to see that Observer One will prefer
186. Inaccessibility would jeopardize any approach that counts mental experience as one
component of well-being (including the approach I argue for in the next Section), not merely
the “objective happiness” framework.
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the profile consisting of two hours of B followed by one hour of C,
over the profile consisting of one hour of A, whereas Observer Two
will have the opposite preference.
If observers can have different rankings of profiles, Kahneman’s
framework for arriving at a cardinal measure of momentary hedonic
experience collapses. If one observer prefers profile P to profile P*,
and another observer has the opposite preference, then clearly there
is no v(.) function such that the sum of duration-weighted v(.) values
will both assign profile P a greater overall value than profile P*, and
assign profile P* a greater overall value than profile P. Consider the
case just mentioned in which Observer One prefers two hours of B
followed by one hour of C to one hour of A, whereas Observer Two
has the opposite preference. It is mathematically impossible to find a
v(.) such that: 2v(B) + v(C) > v(A) and 2v(B) + v(C) < v(A).
In short, when observers have different rankings of profiles,
there will be no v(.) function that represents all of their rankings.
Rather, the cardinal measurement of hedonic experience will be
observer-relative. Observer One will have a cardinal function v1(.),
the sum of whose duration-weighted values will represent his ranking
of profiles; Observer Two will have a different cardinal function v2(.),
the sum of whose duration-weighted values will represent his ranking
of profiles; and so on. Policy aggregates such as gross national
happiness, requiring a cardinal measure of hedonic quality, will also
become observer-relative. For example, gross national happiness
might be greater in outcome x than y, as calculated by adding up the
momentary utilities that track Observer One’s ranking of profiles; but
greater in outcome y than x, as calculated by adding up the
187
momentary utilities that track Observer Two’s ranking of profiles.
3. Circumventing the Observer in Empirical Implementation. In
his empirical implementation of the “objective happiness” approach,
Kahneman has not actually surveyed an observer or observers to rank
hedonic profiles and thereby cardinalize hedonic utilities. (Consider,
by way of contrast, empirical implementation of the QALY approach
to policy analysis, in which observer preferences over health states are
187. Kahneman at one point suggests that ordinal rather than cardinal momentary utilities
will typically be adequate for policy purposes. See Kahneman & Riis, supra note 176, at 290
(“Except for the rare cases in which cumulative distributions [of moment utility over time]
cross, the mean (or the median) of the distribution of moment utility is an ordinal measure of
total utility that can be compared across situations, people and populations.”). The assertion
that the crossing of cumulative distributions will be “rare” is pure speculation.
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actually used to cardinalize health values.) Rather, Kahneman has
gone directly from subjects’ descriptions or ratings of their health
states, to conclusions about their “objective happiness.”
Circumventing the observers renders the empirical exercise less
onerous. It also suppresses difficulties that arise when observers have
divergent rankings. But one can ask whether the results of such an
exercise have much to do with the account of “objective happiness”
that Kahneman defends in his theoretical work.
Consider the study of working women in Texas, which I
189
mentioned in the Introduction. Recall that each respondent was
asked to recollect the episodes of her previous day, and to rate each
episode on various scales of positive or negative affect, all ranging
from values of 0 to 6: for example, how “happy” she felt on a scale of
0 to 6 during the episode, how “warm/friendly” she felt, how
“frustrated/annoyed” she felt, or how “depressed/blue” she felt. A
measure of the respondent’s “positive affect” during the episode was
calculated by averaging how she rated the episode on three of the
scales (happy, warm/friendly, enjoyment), and her “negative affect”
during the episode was similarly calculated by averaging her ratings
on six other scales (frustrated/annoyed, depressed/blue, hassled/
pushed around, angry/hostile, worried/anxious, criticized/put down).
These positive and negative values were averaged, across
subjects, to yield mean affect ratings of different activities. For
example, Kahneman found that eating has an average positive-affect
rating of 4.34, exercise of 4.31, and watching TV of 4.19. He used such
averages not only to compare the affective value of different
activities, but also to analyze the diurnal pattern of affect, and to
assess whether affect is more influenced by an individual’s income or
her temperament.
However, the mean affect ratings employed in the Texas study
seem quite arbitrary—arbitrary from the perspective of Kahneman’s
own account of objective happiness. Moreover, this is true even if one
brackets the problem of interobserver divergence. If observers
converge—a heroic assumption—then Kahneman’s model allows for
the assignment of observer-independent cardinal values to
momentary experiences: cardinal values, the duration-weighted sums
of which correspond to the single ranking of profiles that each and
every observer shares. As already explained, these cardinal values
188. See supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
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express time-tradeoff judgments. If v(A) = 3v(B), then every observer
is indifferent between one hour of A and three hours of B.
But there is no particular reason to think that the values elicited
from subjects via the rating question in the Texas study correspond to
these v(.) values. When a subject says that her happiness during
commuting was “3” on a 0-to-6 scale, and that her happiness during
socializing was “5” on a 0-to-6 scale, is she using these numbers to
express her time-tradeoff judgments? Is she saying that she is
indifferent between T hours commuting, and 3/5T hours socializing?
Why assume that this is what she means? Perhaps she means the
numbers only to have ordinal significance: “5” for socializing and “3”
for commuting just means that socializing is more pleasurable than
commuting. Or perhaps she intends the numbers to do more than
represent the hedonic ordering of experiences, but to communicate
some feature of those experiences, or of her ranking of temporal or
probabilistic bundles of experiences, other than her time-tradeoff
190
judgments.
In his most recent empirical work, Kahneman employs a
different approach (the “U-index”) to measure the hedonic value of
191
moments. Subjects are still asked to assign numerical ratings to a
given episode on different scales of positive and negative affect. But
the episode is then assigned a value of 1 (if the highest rating was for
a scale of negative affect), otherwise 0. Kahneman claims that this
192
193
approach is purely ordinal. That claim is somewhat suspect. A
190. The numbers might be cardinal, but in the sense of (1) representing the respondent’s
ranking of lotteries over experiences, as per expected utility theory; (2) representing the
respondent’s judgments regarding the hedonic differences between experiences; (3) deriving
from a multiattribute function that aggregates subutility functions corresponding to the multiple
dimensions of hedonic experience; or (4) communicating a primitive, cardinal measure of the
felt intensity of the experiences. On this point, note too that QALY values elicited via explicit
time-tradeoff questions need not—and in practice, do not—correspond to QALY values elicited
through a direct rating question or the standard-gamble question. See supra note 77.
191. Krueger et al., supra note 4, at 9.
192. See id. at 19 (stating that “[t]he U-index is an ordinal measure at the level of feelings”
because the classification of an episode as unpleasant or pleasant “relies purely on an ordinal
ranking of the feelings within each episode”).
193. In the theoretical presentation of the “objective happiness” framework, it is assumed
that momentary experiences can be compared to the neutral level, and that experiences within
each hedonic domain (positive or negative) can be compared to each other. So pains are
ordered, pleasures are ordered, but pains and pleasures are not necessarily ordered vis-à-vis
each other except in the sense of being categorized as worse or better than neutral. The U-index
procedure assumes that the intensity of any positive or negative experience can be compared to
the intensity of any other positive or negative experience. See id. at 19 n.13. It is much more
contestable whether subjects can make such comparisons.
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truly ordinal, and more direct, approach would be to ask subjects a
binary question, namely to characterize each episode as, on balance,
worse or better than neutral experience—and to assign it the number
1 in the first case, 0 in the second. But perhaps this direct, binary,
survey would be unreliable, and the actual U-index methodology can
be seen as a reliable proxy for it.
In either event, assigning experiences a number of 1 (for
unpleasant) or 0, and then adding up or averaging these binary
numbers, is a very crude way to assess overall or average hedonic
value of a person or a group. We lose all information about the
relative intensity of hedonic experiences. Jim’s profile of experiences
on Tuesday might be assigned a larger average U-index value than
Jim’s profile today, even though all observers would converge in
194
preferring the Tuesday profile or in judging it better. The U-index
study, like the Texas study, avoids the empirical encumbrance of
actually introducing observers, but it does so at the cost of results that
seem arbitrary by the lights of Kahneman’s own theory of how to
measure affects.
4. Temporal Separability. Kahneman’s measurement scheme
assumes the temporal separability of hedonic value. Roughly, this
means that the sequencing of momentary utility does not affect the
ranking of temporally extended episodes. More precisely, it says that
if two episodes have the same hedonic value during some moment or
moments, the ranking of the episodes does not depend on what
particular value that is.
Kahneman’s argument for temporal separability runs as follows:
The ordering of experiences can affect the utility they confer. For
example, a strenuous tennis game and a large lunch yield a better
experience in one order than in the other because the enjoyment of
the tennis game is sharply reduced when it follows lunch. The
condition of separability, which states that the contribution of an
element to the global utility of the sequence is independent of the
elements that preceded and followed it, is often violated when the
sequences are described in terms of physical events such as lunch
and a tennis game. In a moment-based treatment of total utility,
however, the elements of the sequence that is to be evaluated are
not events but rather moment utilities associated with events.
194. Imagine that Jim on Tuesday has more negative moments than Jim today, but that his
positive moments on Tuesday—when they occur—are intensely positive, whereas nothing so
joyful happens to him today.
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Because all the effects of the order of events are already
incorporated into moment utilities, the order of these moment
195
utilities no longer matters.

However, Kahneman’s insistence that “the order of . . . moment
utilities no longer matters” is sheer ipse dixit. We are back to the
issue of observer convergence and divergence. Might not some
observers judge/prefer lives that trend upwards in terms of
momentary hedonic value, just as some judge/prefer lives that trend
196
upwards in terms of income or health?
5. Integrating Hedonic Value with the Nonhedonic Components of
a Good Life. Hedonic value is one determinant of well-being, but not
the only determinant. It is implausible to claim that an individual’s
welfare is solely constituted by the affective quality of her
experiences. First, such a claim would amount to a kind of
experientialism about well-being; and, as I have already discussed,
experientialism is quite controversial.
Second—and independent of the debate about experientialism—
we should reject hedonism about mental well-being, that is, the
position that hedonic value is the only welfare-relevant aspect of an
197
individual’s mental life. Various examples can be constructed to
drive home this point, but consider just one. Cheery is upbeat, but
forgets much of what happens to him, and his stock of propositional
knowledge is pretty mediocre. Grumpy goes through daily life in an
affective state that is at or slightly below neutral, but he is keenly
focused on the sights and sounds around him, can recollect his past in
rich detail, and has educated himself in various fields. Assume,
further, that Cheery and Grumpy are more or less the same in their
objective characteristics (income, health, job status, social life). Is it
clear that Cheery lives a better life than Grumpy? Hardly.
Indeed, hedonism about mental well-being is regularly rejected
by SWB researchers themselves. Ed Diener, a leading figure, has
consistently defined subjective well-being as a hybrid of affect and life
195. Kahneman, Experienced Utility, supra note 176, at 678.
196. See ADLER, supra note 27, at 419–20; see also Loewenstein, supra note 42, at 100–02
(challenging an approach that measures experiential quality by summing moment utilities, and
noting both that peak negative and positive experiences have an importance that is
disproportionate to their duration and that individuals encode experiences in terms of
“episodes” rather than moments).
197. See, e.g., Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 19 at 1801–04; Loewenstein, supra note 42 at
94–96.
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198

satisfaction. Paul Dolan, Richard Layard, and Robert Metcalfe, in a
report laying the groundwork for large-scale gathering of SWB
statistics by the government of the United Kingdom, recommend that
an individual’s SWB be assessed using three different kinds of
measures: measures of affect, measures of life satisfaction, and
“eudaimonic” measures, the last assessing how “rewarding” or
199
“worthwhile” individuals perceive their activities to be. Kahneman
himself has reversed course and now concedes:
[E]xperienced and evaluated well-being should both be measured,
and . . . the measures should be explicitly separated. Contrary to a
position that one of us espoused earlier (Kahneman 1999), measures
of evaluated well-being are not simply flawed indicators of objective
happiness (experienced well-being). Evaluation and memory are
important on their own . . . because people care deeply about the
200
narrative of their life.

However, Kahneman continues to argue that his “objective
happiness” framework is a good tool for incorporating hedonic value
into policy assessment. The hedonic utility of the positive and
negative affective states experienced by each individual should be
measured separately from whatever nonhedonic attributes are
201
welfare-relevant; and these hedonic utilities should be aggregated or
averaged across persons and moments, as in the Texas and U-index
studies.
But there are two difficulties—one obvious, the second more
subtle—with this position. First, the “objective happiness”
framework, itself, offers no guidance in balancing the hedonic and
nonhedonic aspects of well-being. Imagine that we predict that a
policy will increase the average “objective happiness” of some
population, but reduce some measure of their average nonhedonic
well-being. Is the policy worthwhile, all things considered?
The more subtle point is that the very assignment of hedonic
utilities to individual moments—at least as Kahneman conceptualizes
it—assumes the separability of hedonic and nonhedonic attributes.
Remember his formal model. The observer considers temporally
extended episodes (“profiles”), characterized in terms of the affects
198. See, e.g., Diener et al., supra note 1, at 277.
199. DOLAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 6–9.
200. Kahneman & Riis, supra note 176, at 289 (citing Kahneman, Objective Happiness,
supra note 176).
201. See id.
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experienced by the subject during each moment, and ranks these—
yielding a cardinal measure of momentary hedonic experience, what I
referred to above as the v(.) value of that experience. But—now that
Kahneman has, properly, conceded the welfare-relevance of
nonhedonic attributes—the insistence that any given observer has
such a ranking becomes problematic.
To be sure, the observer will have a conditional ranking of
hedonic profiles. Assume that N is a possible profile of nonhedonic,
welfare-relevant, attributes that a subject might possess. N includes
both nonhedonic mental attributes (an individual’s memory,
perceptions, sense of satisfaction, and so forth) and whatever
nonmental attributes are seen to be welfare-relevant (for example,
health). H is one possible hedonic profile, that is, a sequence of
hedonic attributes, H* a second possible hedonic profile, H** a third,
and so forth. Then the observer will be able to rank NH versus NH*
versus NH**. We can call this the ranking of hedonic episodes
+
conditional on nonhedonic profile N. Similarly, if N is a different
specification of nonhedonic attributes, the observer will be able to
+
+
+
rank N H versus N H* versus N H**. We can call this second ranking
the ranking of hedonic episodes conditional on nonhedonic profile
+
N.
But it is a further question whether the observer’s ranking of
hedonic episodes is invariant to nonhedonic attributes, namely, that if
the observer has a particular ranking of hedonic episodes conditional
+
++
on N, then she has the very same ranking conditional on N , on N ,
and every other nonhedonic profile. Why believe that invariance
holds true? Might it not be possible that the observer prefers NH to
+
+
+
NH* to NH**, but N H** to N H to N H*? Invariance precludes
interaction effects between affective content, on the one hand, and
anything else occurring in someone’s life on the other. The preclusion
of such interaction is highly problematic. For example, who would
want to experience a mental life in which the pairing of affects and
memories is random, as opposed to being appropriate to what is
remembered? Similarly, insofar as health is an intrinsic determinant
of well-being, why think that the ranking of temporally extended
sequences of pains and pleasures is invariant to the sequence of
health states?
It is tempting to respond that the possible interaction between
hedonic and nonhedonic attributes is a nuance which policy tools,
necessarily crude and approximate, may need to ignore. But this
response misunderstands the objection. Once we have assigned
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hedonic utilities to moments, we may (for practical reasons) need to
ignore their correlation with nonhedonic attributes, in evaluating
policies. However, we still need some rationale for this assignment.
We still need some theory of what is being measured. Kahneman’s
theory is that hedonic utilities represent the preferences/judgments of
an observer, ranking temporally extended hedonic episodes. But—
once interaction effects are allowed into the picture—the observer
may have no such ranking. If you ask her, “Do you prefer H to H* or
H* to H?” she may respond: “The question is meaningless. I have
various conditional preferences/judgments regarding the episodes,
but no unconditional preference/judgment. To ask me for such a
preference/judgment is like asking whether I prefer a long-sleeved or
a short-sleeved shirt, to which I’ll answer, “The first in cold weather,
the second in warm.”
C. A Better Approach?
In this Section, I very briefly sketch a different methodology than
the “objective happiness” framework for incorporating information
about experiential quality into policy analysis. I lack space to
elaborate this methodology at length, but at least I can suggest how
the limitations in Kahneman’s framework might be remedied.
A preference-based view of well-being allows for an individual’s
happiness, or some other aspect of her experiential quality, to be one
of the fundamental arguments for her preferences. Indeed, it would
be absurd for the preferentialist to insist that only nonmental
properties can be intrinsic determinants of well-being! However, the
simplified utility functions adopted in classical economic theory and
in much empirical work have ignored experiential arguments. Instead,
preference utility is often modeled as a function of one or more
nonmental attributes, quintessentially income, bundles of
commodities, health, leisure, or the physical state of the environment.
This sort of simplified model of preferences, while more
tractable, has a downside when coupled with policy tools such as costbenefit analysis. Policy impacts on happiness, and thus on well-being,
cannot be directly measured. Instead, it must be assumed (plausibly)
that policies causally affect happiness via changes to individuals’
nonmental attributes and (less plausibly) that individuals can
accurately predict how changes in nonmental attributes affect their
happiness and thus that their intrinsic preferences for happiness are
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fully captured by the instrumental component of their preferences for
202
nonmental attributes.
A richer model of preferences explicitly includes experiential
properties. A given attribute bundle A is characterized as A = (M, N),
where M describes one or more types of mental attributes, and N
nonmental attributes. For short, call this a “hybrid bundle.”
Individual i’s preferences over hybrid attribute bundles are inferred
from stated-preference surveys or, perhaps, behavioral evidence.
Individual i’s ordinal preference-utility function for hybrid bundles
captures his ranking of these bundles. That ordinal preference-utility
function takes the form ui(M, N). If income is included among the
nonmental attributes, this ordinal preference-utility function is
sufficient to determine individual i’s willingness to pay/accept for
changes in the mental attributes.
Information about individual WTP/WTA for experiential
changes allows for the direct incorporation of such changes in policy
modeling. For example, imagine that a costly proposed regulation,
lowering the ambient level of some feared environmental toxin, will
have the benefit of reducing deaths and injuries and reducing anxiety
about the toxin. Information about individual WTP/WTA for fear
and anxiety allow us to undertake a cost-benefit test of the regulation
that explicitly identifies fear-reduction as a separate “good”
additional to physical harm-avoidance.
An individual’s cardinal utility function for hybrid bundles would
be determined by her ranking of bundles plus further facts about her
preferences (for example, her ranking of bundle lotteries or her timetradeoff preferences). Such cardinal utility functions are not required
by cost-benefit analysis but might be required by other policy tools
(for example, a GDP-like measure that aggregates/averages
preference-utility across persons, with preference-utility in turn
dependent on both experiential and nonexperiential attributes).
The approach now under discussion might seem utopian (or
dystopian, for skeptics about policy analysis) but in fact has some
precedent in existing empirical work. A small literature does try to
estimate individual WTP/WTA for fear and anxiety (with application
both to environmental regulation and to policing strategies that

202. The literature on errors in individual affective forecasting makes this latter premise less
plausible. See, e.g., Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 121, at 168–73.
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203

mitigate the fear of crime). The QALY literature looks at individual
preferences over health states. The QALY number assigned to a
health state (between 0 and 1) captures such preferences, for
example, time-tradeoff preferences as between living a period of time
in perfect health and living longer in a poorer health state. The health
states thus valued sometimes encompass mental, not just physical
health. It is not unusual to find QALY values for conditions such as
204
depression, pain, or chronic anxiety.
Estimating individuals’ preference-utility for hybrid bundles via
standard preference-elicitation techniques (stated-preference surveys
or inference from behavioral evidence) is to be sharply distinguished
from the methodology criticized in Part II: using SWB surveys as
evidence of preference utility, that is, taking an individual’s stated life
satisfaction when in possession of bundle A as his preference utility
for A. What is being recommended is not that an SWB number be
employed as a proxy for preference utility, but rather that an
individual’s experiences be included among the determinants of
preference utility.
Indeed, this approach does not essentially rely upon the
assignment of numbers to mental states. In a stated-preference
survey, the experiential component of a hybrid bundle could be
described via a number (“imagine experiencing pain that you might
rate at 4 on a scale of 1 to 5”), but it could also be described
qualitatively—and indeed a qualitative description might be more
successful in accurately communicating to respondents what the state
feels like.
The approach also has key advantages over Kahneman’s
“objective happiness” framework. First, although that framework
seeks only to quantify the well-being impact of affective states, in a
hedonic utility number, the “hybrid bundle” approach is more
generic. If A = (M, N), with M mental attributes, M itself might be
unidimensional or multidimensional and, in either event, might
include affective states, memory, cognition, sense of satisfaction or
purpose, and so forth. Second, the “objective happiness” framework
203. E.g., Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear
and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 1024–30 (2004); Paul Dolan, Graham Loomes, Tessa
Peasgood & Aki Tsuchiya, Estimating the Intangible Victim Costs of Violent Crime, 45 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 958, 959–64 (2005).
204. See Adler, supra note 203, at 979–80, 1043–52; Paul Dolan & Tessa Peasgood,
Estimating the Economic and Social Costs of the Fear of Crime, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 121,
126 (2007).
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may be undermined by the bivalence of pain and pleasure—the fact
that positive and negative affect may really be two, separate,
dimensions of experience—but the hybrid-bundle approach is
perfectly compatible with affective bivalence. Third, the hybridbundle approach is not committed to any kind of separability with
respect to an individual’s ranking of bundles: temporal separability,
the separability of hedonic value from other aspects of experiential
quality, or the separability of hedonic and nonmental attributes.
Fourth, the approach provides a basis for making all-thingsconsidered policy judgments, integrating information about policy
impacts on experiential quality with other sorts of impacts. If we
know someone’s preference utility for different hybrid bundles, then
we know how she makes tradeoffs between the experiential and
nonexperiential components of these bundles. The governmental
choice between multiple policies, characterized by different kinds of
experiential and nonexperiential effects, can then be a function of the
totality of individual tradeoffs—as operationalized via cost-benefit
analysis (the sum of individual WTP/WTA amounts), or perhaps in
some other way.
Fifth, at least insofar as this approach seeks only to infer
individuals’ ordinal preference-utility functions—which is all that is
required for purposes of CBA and the determination of WTP/WTA
amounts—the approach does not presuppose that individuals have
205
the same preferences. The ranking of hybrid bundles can vary from
individual to individual. By contrast, as we have seen, Kahneman’s
“objective happiness” framework makes the implausible
presupposition that “observers” will have the very same ranking of
206
temporally extended hedonic episodes (“profiles”).
The elicitation of preference utility for hybrid bundles
presupposes that individuals have well-behaved preferences over such
bundles—if not initially, then at least after debiasing and information205. Let x and y be two outcomes. In order to determine what a given individual is
WTP/WTA for the move from x to y, all we need to know, in principle, is how he orders
attribute bundles (including both income and whatever non-income attributes are specified in
the outcomes). This ordering is captured by his ordinal utility function. Moreover, individuals i
and j might have different rankings of attribute bundles, and suitable estimation techniques
(such as stated-preference surveys) are robust to such heterogeneity. See supra Part II.C.
Admittedly, if we were to compare x and y by using a cardinal utility function for
attribute bundles, heterogeneity in utility functions would become a problem. Comparing the
sums or averages of bundle utilities using one method for assigning cardinal utilities could yield
a different result than comparing those sums or averages using a different method.
206. See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text.
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provision. Preference skeptics will deny this, pointing to violations of
207
rationality conditions —and this challenge is a serious challenge to
the “hybrid bundle” approach. But, as I have just reminded the
reader, Kahneman’s theory for assigning hedonic utilities to moments
also depends upon an observer having a preference/judgment ranking
of hedonic profiles. This observer is suppressed in Kahneman’s
empirical work—with consequent difficulties that I elaborated upon
in discussing the Texas and U-index studies. It is ironic that
Kahneman, in some scholarship, comes across as an ardent
208
preference skeptic. If actual individuals (even after debiasing) are
incapable of satisfying rationality conditions requisite for holding a
preference, then who is the observer whose well-behaved ordering of
profiles is supposed to satisfy such conditions? In short, Kahneman’s
“objective happiness” framework is no more immune from
preference skepticism than the hybrid-bundle approach.
CONCLUSION
Enthusiasm about the policy role of SWB surveys is premature.
Why think that the number which someone assigns to her momentary
or overall happiness, life satisfaction, positive or negative affect, or
some other aspect of her experiential state offers real help in
evaluating governmental policies? Two different answers to this
question need to be teased apart. One says that a higher self-rated
degree of life satisfaction shows that the respondent’s preferences are
more fully realized. In short, SWB surveys evidence preference utility.
But the evidence would seem to be pretty poor. Preference and scale
heterogeneity hamper the use of self-rated life satisfaction to make
inferences about preference utility. Even if all respondents share the
same underlying preferences and utility function, someone’s answer
to an SWB survey may well be skewed by evaluation error or
miscommunication. This number may well be an inaccurate and,
indeed, statistically biased indicator of the degree to which her lifecircumstances realize her preferences.
207. Either the minimal conditions required to have a preference at all, or the conditions
requisite for the preference to have normative “bite.” See supra notes 35–48.
208. See Dolan & Kahneman, supra note 56, at 215–16 (questioning the usefulness of
measures of “decision utility,” that is, preference utility, as a basis for valuing health states,
because individuals’ preferences regarding health are inevitably biased to some extent);
Kahneman et al., supra note 121, at 228–29 (claiming that “people are better described as having
attitudes than preferences,” with attitudes “lack[ing] some of the essential properties that
economic theory requires of preferences”).
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Stated-preference surveys dominate SWB surveys as evidence of
preference-realization. Anomalies using the stated-preference format
suggest the importance of debiasing preferences—rendering them
rational and well-informed. Perhaps debiasing is fruitless. But that
would show that government policy choice must (somehow) find a
normative foundation other than individuals’ preferences, and not
that preferences should be inferred via the SWB technique.
Skepticism about the rationality of preferences hardly advances the
PR (preference-realization) defense of SWB surveys.
The second answer to the “why” question takes a different tack,
suggesting that a happiness, affect, or life-satisfaction rating is a
measure of experiential quality. Thus goes the EQ defense of SWB
surveys. Kahneman’s “objective happiness” framework—using SWB
surveys focused on momentary hedonic quality—is an important first
step in developing a policy-relevant measure of experiential quality.
Kahneman does not argue that well-being and good experiences are
equivalent—but rather, much more plausibly, that good experiences
are one important aspect of well-being.
However, a close examination of the “objective happiness”
framework suggests significant limitations. The framework purports
to cardinalize momentary hedonic utilities by appealing to an
“observer’s” ranking of temporally extended hedonic episodes, but
presupposes—without justification—that observers have the same
ranking, and that these rankings are separable from nonhedonic
attributes. In empirical implementation, Kahneman has suppressed
the observer and, most recently, abandoned any attempt at
cardinalization—via a “U-index” that merely reports the fraction of
time that individuals spend in an affectively unpleasant state. This is a
crude measure of hedonic quality (let alone the nonhedonic aspects of
experiential life, such as memory or a sense of meaning), because it
does not tell us about the intensity of individuals’ affective states.
It remains unclear whether SWB surveys—asking for a
numerical rating of experiences—should be the central tool for
incorporating information about experiential quality into policy
analysis. At least in principle, a different approach, more closely
continuous with traditional cost-benefit analysis, is available: namely,
to use revealed or stated-preference evidence to infer individuals’
preferences over “hybrid bundles,” comprising both experiential and
nonexperiential attributes. SWB surveys are at most an ancillary
component of this approach. Its central focus is inferring preference
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utility, with experiential attributes merely one entry in the utility
function.
Much more work remains to elaborate both this approach and
frameworks (such as “objective happiness”) that revolve around SWB
surveys. In undertaking this effort, scholars should exercise caution,
taking care not to muddy their concepts—taking care to understand
that well-being need not reduce to good experiences, that individuals
can have intrinsic preferences for aspects of their lives other than
their mental states, and that someone’s perceived degree of happiness
or life satisfaction can diverge from her true preference utility.

